



HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY AS A SCIENCE: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS OF DEVELOPMENT

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| Article history: | Abstract: |
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| Received: 8 th December 2022 Accepted: 10 th January 2023 Published: 14 th February 2023 | The article highlights some of the problems of modern historical and philosophical science, the emergence of which is associated with a discussion of its scientific status and prospects for further development. In modern times, the philosophy of history has become the focus of attention of many historians and philosophers. Herder wrote an extensive work, "Ideas for the Philosophy of the History of Mankind," which gives a broad panorama of the entire world history. As he writes, he was interested in a science that would describe the entire history of mankind from the moment of its inception. Herder considers the philosophy of history to be such a science. And he created a philosophical and historical work that played an important role in the development of the philosophy of history as a special discipline. |
| Keywords: history of philosophy, regularities of the historical and philosophical process, the subject of philosophical knowledge, conditions for the possibility of historical and philosophical research, metaphilosophy. | |

Today, the history of philosophy still has tremendous charm for many people. The words of Hegel remain unfading for us that "the core of interest in the history of philosophy should be sought in the deep connection between the past and the present stage reached by philosophy. This connection expresses its inner nature" [1]. The article deals with some problems of historical and philosophical science, which traditionally arouse increased interest among researchers and play a special role in the development of its subject area. The pragmatic aspect of the given topic is related to the discussion of possible conditions and prospects for the development of the history of philosophy, along with the tasks that Uzbek historical and philosophical science will have to solve in the near future.

In modern literature, the term "history of philosophy" is used in three senses:

First, it is the process of development of philosophical knowledge, fixed in philosophical texts.

Secondly, the historiography of philosophy is called the history of philosophy. In works on the history of philosophy, individual periods of the historical and philosophical process in various countries or regions are reproduced, up to a particular thinker or even his individual views.

Thirdly, the history of philosophy is called reflection on the very process of historiography: why is this historiography needed, what are the properties and features of the historical-philosophical process, what are the methods of its reproduction, etc. It is the third history of philosophy that is reproduced as a science [2]. In the article, the concept of "history of philosophy" is used mainly in the third sense as a theory of the historiography of philosophy.

Conditions for the possibility of historical and philosophical science. The history of philosophy occupies a special position among philosophical disciplines. The "privileged" status of this science is justified by the fact that "the study of the history of philosophy is the study of philosophy itself" [1]. The history of philosophy is a tried and tested model solution for the institutionalization of philosophy, when the scientific status of philosophy is in doubt. Philosophy in Uzbekistan is experiencing a similar situation today as a specialized field of knowledge. Philosophy, which is transformed into the history of philosophy, largely meets the general requirements of a disciplinary nature. The history of philosophy has an undoubted subject of study - these are, as a rule, written sources that act as the empirical basis of this science. One of the central problems is to identify the general conditions for the possibility of conducting historical and philosophical research.

The possibility and effectiveness of historical and philosophical work depends on a number of conditions. There is no doubt that the appeal to the works of historical philosophers in the absence of appropriate philosophical skills, competence, erudition will inevitably lead the novice researcher to a misunderstanding and distorted interpretations of their thoughts. In order to understand the thoughts of such remarkable philosophers as Descartes, Leibniz, and Kant, one must "puzzle one's head" over the problems that occupied them, which are actually the subject of philosophical research.

It seems that a precondition for us to enter into the way of thinking of classical philosophers should be an attitude that prohibits considering the issues discussed by them as "closed", and the proposed conclusions as once

and for all displaced and overcome by other philosophers. Anyone who follows this rule will very soon realize that two different philosophers are able to achieve similar results that differ significantly in the form of their presentation, so they both deserve the same "place of honor" in the history of philosophy. For example, Occam and Hume, Hegel and Sartre.

A specialist in the history of philosophy must be prepared to the maximum extent for a receptive comprehension of the philosophical ideas of his outstanding predecessors, for painstaking work with sources, for intense mental activity with concepts. The historian of philosophy must not avoid those methods of work that are currently used by the historical and social sciences, since the closure of the history of philosophy in the world of "pure" ideas indicates a belittling of the intellectual possibilities of philosophy itself. At the same time, through the recognition of the historical "other", the interpreter carries out a reflective comprehension of the congeniality of his own philosophical position [3].

In addition, the special position of historical-philosophical science imposes on the researcher the duty to answer for everything that happens to philosophy; including he must be able to explain the causes of the crisis in modern philosophy.

Subject field of the history of philosophy. The central theoretical problem of the history of philosophy is the question of the subject of its study. The more diverse research appears on the history of a particular subject, the more difficult it becomes to identify the subject itself. Depending on how we understand the nature of philosophical knowledge, the researcher's methodological approach to the history of philosophy is largely determined.

"If this first premise, the idea of the subject of philosophy, turns out to be shaky, then history itself in general will necessarily turn out to be something shaky" [1]. Therefore, the discussion of the problems of the history of philosophy is important and must be started from a basic level, namely, from consideration of the nature of philosophical knowledge. Consideration of this problem opens the way for us to discuss many other questions of historical and philosophical science.

Bertrand Russell called philosophy a "No Man's Land" situated between science and theology and "open to attacks from both sides" [4]. This expresses the essence of the matter. Consisting in the fact that philosophy has a dual nature: in one part it is related to science, in the other part to theology. Science generates questions that are beyond its own competence. Such questions are usually called metaphysical, and they form a characteristic and inseparable part of the subject matter of philosophy.

At the same time, we have the opportunity to turn to an authoritative system of theology to consider a special metaphysical problem. We can get certain clarifications if we operate with the concept of God as the root cause and ultimate goal of all that exists. True, it should be borne in mind that any attempt to rationally substantiate theology, which represents answers to metaphysical questions, in itself constitutes a form of philosophical thinking. Therefore, it is not surprising that, despite the differences between theology and philosophy, the question of the possibility of theology itself has been and remains a fundamental philosophical problem.

A distinctive feature of philosophical problems is that they do not have an unambiguous solution, therefore some philosophers are convinced that the problems of philosophy are not only unsolvable, but also meaningless (L. Wittgenstein). Yet if a philosophical problem takes the form of a question, then any answer given to it must be judged in terms of truth or falsity. If we agree that there is no right answer, then all the answers proposed by philosophers of the past should be considered false. Therefore, one who decides to give a definite (true) answer to a philosophical question must offer strong, rational arguments in order for this answer to be accepted by others, to acquire intersubjective support and recognition.

It should also be noted that philosophy reacts vividly to changes in the social reality that surrounds us, it is this feature that allows us to consider philosophical constructions as "thoughts of their era" (Hegel). But philosophy is capable of turning into dogma if, despite the ongoing changes in reality, the same type of philosophizing is recreated.

In the process of formation and development of Western philosophy, thinkers appeared, and with them certain schools that laid the foundation for the so-called. "metaphilosophy", that is, a certain theory of philosophical thinking. Such a theory is intended to explain how a completely abstract, deductive intellectual discipline about the ways of comprehending truth is possible. Metaphilosophy includes two types of philosophizing that have developed within the framework of the history of philosophy. According to the first of them, the purpose of philosophical thinking is speculation or theorizing. Philosophers who follow the tradition of Pythagoras and Plato believe that philosophy acquires the characteristic of abstractness because it is engaged in the speculative study of abstract things, especially those that are inaccessible to sensory experience. Such philosophers, as a rule, reproach the empirical sciences for producing half-truths, since empirical research itself is limited only to the field of phenomena, while speculative philosophy has an obvious advantage, since it is turned to the sphere of necessity, where the true content is found. peace.

Another group of philosophers, representing the second type of philosophizing within the framework of metaphilosophy, considers philosophy as the field of the ultimate level of abstraction, not because it talks about sublime and abstract worlds, but because it is occupied with the more mundane and urgent task of intellectual criticism (or criticism of reason). Proponents of this approach are convinced that philosophy should explore the methods and goals of specific forms of thinking, in order to then generalize the conclusions about the limits of human knowledge and the nature of certainty. Abstraction here means abstraction from the specific, and not an appeal to a particular sphere of being. Philosophical truth is characterized as the truth about the limits of human understanding.

Such a position is inherent in the analytical or critical orientation in philosophy, it is represented most authoritatively in the writings of I. Kant. Today, this approach dominates Anglo-American (analytical) philosophy in the form of "conceptual" or "linguistic" analysis.

But the history of a philosophical problem, at whatever level of abstraction it is considered, always creates in the researcher a steady desire for synthesis and theoretical reasoning. Therefore, despite the fact that the analytical style of philosophizing looks, at first glance, too limited and may seem like just a verbal game or logical ping-pong, over time this way of philosophical reflection can produce results in which metaphysical implications can reach the level of great speculative systems. Analytic philosophy is often reproached for not dealing with truly philosophical problems of a global nature, but drowning in particulars, to which a real philosopher should not be distracted. However, "analytic philosophy has shown that attention to the nuance in philosophy is no less important than the desire for the universal, and it is attention to the nuance that can be most fruitful" [5]. Philosophy as a way of comprehending the truth through thought, as a subject of historical and philosophical science, is in continuous development. Despite the obvious differences between the philosophical teachings that we find in the history of philosophy, the common thing between them is their philosophical nature. The practice of philosophizing supports the continuous development of philosophical thought. And the result of philosophizing can be not only continuity in philosophy, but also the expansion of the horizon of philosophical questions [3].

The problem of the regularities of the historical-philosophical process. An essential feature of philosophical thinking is the pursuit of truth as its main goal. However, in the face of various philosophical approaches, conclusions and opposing systems, one gets the impression that this epistemological task is impossible and is more of an illusory dream than a realistically achievable project. It is reasonable to assume that if there is such a thing as philosophical research, the purpose of which is to comprehend the truth, then in the history of philosophy there should be progress, the existence of generally accepted theoretical principles in the form of true premises, uniform methodological standards, norms of the community of philosophers. In the history of philosophy, signs of sustainable development should be found, accompanied by the obsolescence of philosophical theories and their subsequent replacement by new true systems. This is exactly the picture we see in the natural sciences, where scientists, having received new results, overcome and discard old scientific theories as unnecessary and erroneous.

However, in philosophy we do not find such a state of affairs. Today's researchers study the works of Plato and Aristotle as scrupulously as many centuries ago, and acquaintance with the arguments of these outstanding ancient Greek thinkers for a modern philosopher is as important as many centuries ago.

A scientist, on the contrary, may be interested in the history of his subject of study, but often he simply ignores it without prejudice to the final result. Science, advancing towards truth, always builds its reasoning on the basis of established facts, it has the inalienable right to overthrow the most skillful, convincing and beautiful of the previously created theoretical systems, as, for example, Copernicus and Galileo refuted the cosmology of Ptolemy and Aristotle. From which we can conclude that a modern scientist, even if he has not heard anything about Ptolemy and Aristotle, is able to make important discoveries in cosmology.

But should we consider the history of philosophy as the history of any science and declare (as is the case in the history of science) that we know better than our predecessors what they were talking about (R. Rorty)? I think that an affirmative answer to this question only veils the essence of the problem. Undoubtedly, "any history is written by "winners"", who seek to justify their predilections and justify the logical regularity of the maturation of a particular philosophical theory or approach derived from past experience. However, the very process of identifying the patterns of development of philosophical knowledge and recognizing the determinations of the thoughts of specific thinkers is a serious problem for us.

If the progressive development of the history of science (natural science) is not in doubt and the task is only to offer a relevant explanatory model, then the history of philosophy cannot boast of such successes. Of course, one can try to prove that there is progress in philosophy, but it is extremely slow, that the very problem of the evolution of philosophical knowledge is extremely complex, since the solution of any philosophical problem is located on the border of human understanding. Or the nature of the subject of philosophy is such that any theoretical research is always a new attempt, since nothing is taken for granted in philosophy. However, all these justifications will hardly satisfy us. An acquaintance with three different concepts of the history of philosophy helps to assess the scale of this problem.

In the first concept, philosophy is seen as a progressive unfolding of truth, beginning with the intellectual revelations of the ancient Greeks and culminating in Hegel's exhaustive, elaborate philosophical system. This position is based on the idea of progress. Supporters of the progressive approach are convinced that science as a way of knowing the truth is a true model of philosophy. And Hegel's ability to bring his scientific system to a progressive articulation serves as a weighty argument for its solidity. For Hegel, the history of philosophy is a single and therefore necessary process of the ascent of the spirit to itself. The history of philosophy is not a naked succession of various opinions and teachings, incoherently succeeding each other. In the system of speculative idealism, philosophy comes to an end, that is, it reaches its highest height and henceforth ends. "Hegel's thesis on the completion of philosophy is shocking. But the thesis of its completion does not mean that philosophy has ended in the sense of termination and break. Rather, it is completion that only makes it possible for diverse designs down to their simplest forms: rough inversion and massive confrontation" [1]. According to the progressive concept of the history of philosophy, the end result of the movement of philosophy is more important than its beginning, and the goal of absolute knowledge is a

model in the language of which all previous stages of the development of the history of philosophy should be evaluated and determined.

The opposite model interprets the process of birth and formation of the history of philosophy as a radical degeneration that distorts its original beginning. The origins of philosophy are infinitely rich, and they awaken in us the need to restore the authentic voice of Being, as it was once spoken by the pre-Socratic philosophers. This view is most clearly expressed in the works of M. Heidegger. Heidegger, proceeding from the question of being, tried to describe metaphysics as a single process of forgetting being. According to this alternative, the beginning of philosophy is more fundamental than its subsequent development. However, "Heidegger's thinking approach to the history of philosophy suffers from the violence inherent in a thinker driven by his own questions and trying to recognize himself in everything" [7]. This brings us back to the problem of technology (methodology) of the historiography of philosophy.

In the dispute between these two opposite sides regarding the laws of the historical and philosophical process, the voice of L. Wittgenstein and his followers is clearly heard today. Wittgenstein's approach to the history of philosophy can be called eliminative (or stationary). Philosophy in the understanding of Wittgenstein should play a critically destructive role ("criticism of language") in relation to the theoretical constructions of philosophers. Philosophical delusions, conceptual confusion, according to Wittgenstein, are subject to every person who communicates, reflects, suffers, learns, etc., on the basis of ordinary language. It is with the study and mastery of the grammatical forms of everyday language that a person involuntarily inherits eternal philosophical problems. Hence, the entire history of philosophy is interpreted by him as the history of conceptual errors on the same philosophical questions, generated by stable grammatical forms of our natural language. "Our language remains the same and again and again inclines us to ask the same questions..." [5].

As we can see, the differences in approaches to the history of philosophy are directly due to ideas about the nature of philosophy and the methods of its development. The question of the adequacy of the historical and philosophical conception still remains open. But the diversity of concepts in the history of philosophy should be taken not as a shortcoming or immaturity of this science, but as evidence of its development.

Only a few problems of the history of philosophy considered above characterize it as an established and continuously developing specialized field of knowledge production. The designated range of problems of historical and philosophical science sets the vector for its further development. The scientific status of the history of philosophy as a special discipline, determined by the criteria of objectivity, consistency, validity, conceptual clarity, etc., today does not raise doubts among researchers. At the same time, the process of identification (and professionalization) of philosophy that has taken place in Uzbek over the past two decades poses the following tasks for Uzbek historians of philosophy: to rethink philosophical development; analyze the real state of philosophical knowledge in society in a specific time period; reveal the factors under the influence of which the dominant philosophical teachings are created and assimilated; to clarify the mechanisms for the dissemination of philosophical ideas in the public consciousness, etc. The solution of these descriptive tasks is connected with the need for the history of philosophy to develop its own analytical apparatus that corresponds to its subject.

Modern historical and philosophical science has yet to make the transition from the established (neo-Kantian) "canon" of the presentation of historical philosophers to the study of the real history of philosophy and the social context of its functioning. Therefore, the historian of philosophy must know and understand well the philosophical teachings of the thinkers of the past, strive to present the ideas of the author in "his own terms" (as far as possible). This key task, ultimately, should subordinate all the others in the work of the researcher. The degree of their awakening effect on the consciousness of our contemporaries, as well as the formation in us of a reverent, enthusiastic attitude to the results of their intellectual creativity, depends on how thoroughly and truthfully the reconstructions (rational and / or immanent) of the ideas of the great thinkers of the past are made.

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