



THE ROLE OF THE OGPU IN ENDING THE FIGHT AGAINST THE SOVIET POWER IN THE UZBEK SSR (1925-1926)

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Article history:	Abstract:
Received: 7 th December 2021 Accepted: 10 th January 2022 Published: 18 th February 2022	The article analyzes the role of the OGPU in ending the struggle against Soviet power in the Uzbek SSR in 1925-1935. The processes associated with the military tactics used by the OGPU to suppress the armed movement, intelligence operations, control over the activities of local governments, and measures aimed at strengthening the influence of Soviet power are considered.
Keywords: OGPU, soviet power, armed movement, kurboshi, local self-government, judiciary, intelligence, military units.	

The first task facing the Soviet government was to seize this power, and the next major task was to keep this power. It was more difficult to retain and consolidate power than to seize it. That is why the Soviet government was in dire need of an intensified punitive campaign by political organizations. One of these organizations was the United State Political Administration (OGPU), which operated from 1922 to 1934. The activities of the OGPU in Uzbekistan and its tragedies in the life of the Turkic peoples have not yet been studied as a separate study. Only in the work of academician N. Karimov a general description of the OGPU is given [1].

The struggle against Soviet power in Central Asia in 1925-1935. was the result of not only land reform and collectivization, but also disenfranchisement of the local population, youth recruitment, injustice in tax policy, women's liberation movement, religious policy, as well as aspects related to discrimination, forced displacement, which also had a strong influence on the dynamics fight.

The OGPU carefully studied the attitude of the population to all the reforms carried out by the Soviet government in Central Asia. In particular, the activities of those who were anti-Soviet were constantly in the spotlight. For example, a May 1925 report stated that protests against Soviet rule were active at this time in the Leninsky district of Turkmenistan. *In connection with the process of struggle against Soviet power in Uzbekistan, the OGPU revealed:*

the surrendered kurbashi tried to gather junior leaders and people on their side and establish power in the villages;

in particular, the fact that the leading leaders of the prestigious uprising were conducting lawsuits among the population and applying sanctions in accordance with Sharia law;

it was possible to identify such important issues as the collection of taxes from participants in the armed movement. Also during this period, the Kashkadarya region of Uzbekistan became the most active center of the armed movement; deterioration of relations between the rebels and the population of Tajikistan; analyzed the presence of personal hostility between the leaders of the armed movement[2].

The main form of struggle used by the OGPU to stop the armed struggle against the Soviet regime in Central Asia was the deployment of military garrisons, the organization and use of fighter and flying detachments. In addition, in the event of the termination of the activities of large groups, the practice of unification of all military forces was developed and applied [3]. In order to put an end to the struggle against Soviet power, the OGPU not only supported military operations, but also used various other tactics. For example, during the rallies, it was proposed to surrender, searches were conducted among the population, weapons were collected, leaders of the armed movement were handed over, attacks on government agencies were not committed. Only in most cases were the decisions on the immediate execution of the arrested leaders of the struggle cancelled [4]. In this case, firstly, the possibility of an uprising among the population was taken into account, and secondly, the question of not mercilessly showing Soviet power in the eyes of the population was analyzed very carefully.

In addition to identifying in which republics and regions of Central Asia the struggle against the Soviet power was the strongest, the OGPU sought to identify the interaction of the leaders of the armed movement and their relationship with the population. The goal was to end the struggle against Soviet power as soon as possible. However, as stated in the documents of the OGPU, it was not possible to quickly stop the struggle. Because the participants in the armed movement against the Soviet regime and the people who supported it were also in the majority. The

organs of the OGPU, which revealed the situation, set as their main task the strengthening of measures for the transition of the population to the side of the Soviet power.

According to a report for June 1925, as a result of operations carried out by the cavalry units of the OGPU, the armed movement in the region of Karakalpakstan and Turkmenistan was significantly reduced. As a result of the operations carried out against them by the OGPU cavalry units, their activities were suspended or they continued to operate in the desert. However, the fight against members of the armed movement in the deserts was much more difficult for the Red Army. In general, it was not possible to completely stop the armed movement during this period. Because the constant addition and support of the local population in groups would ensure the continuity of the movement. Locals were always considered assistants to the detachments. In addition, the leaders of the struggle, who moved to Soviet territory, tried to save their group. Because the main rival for them was, firstly, the Red Army, and secondly, there was mutual hostility between the leaders of the movement [5].

The OGPU, which studied Central Asia, provides such information about the political situation for September 1925. The armed movement cannot be considered completely finished. The movement of Kurbashi has intensified in the Zarafshan, Kashkadarya and Surkhandarya regions of Uzbekistan. In Tajikistan, Ibrahimbek's changes in tax policy also led to great success among the population. The essence of the change in the tax system made by Ibrahimbek was that the tax collected from the population for participants in the armed movement was collected only from the rich and landowners. After such a tax policy pursued by Ibrahimbek in the interests of the population, it was noticed that the number of people joining his groups increased, and the number of participants in the movement increased. Every action of the leaders of kurash was under the constant control of the OGPU and other Soviet bodies. Another method used by the OGPU to stop the fight against Soviet power was the constant monitoring of the behavior of former emir or khan officials, rich, wealthy and religious people, as well as their children, working in the lower echelons of the Soviet apparatus. There has also been speculation that they were or may have been in constant contact with the armed movement. That is why people in this social category were fired from Soviet institutions [6].

The OGPU also analyzed the activities of the Soviet authorities to stop the struggle against the Soviet regime. Observations and analysis of the organization came to the conclusion that Soviet power in the countryside did not exist at all. Because in many villages occupied at that time by the Kurds, civil and military power was exercised directly by them. In such areas, the rules established by the Soviet government did not apply. Locally, they were elected only on behalf of the Soviet government. The OGPU also paid special attention to the types of taxes levied on the population and by whom they are collected. Because the mechanism of taxes levied on the population was one of the main economic pillars of the struggle against the Soviet regime. In Kurbashi, the tax in the villages was mainly carried out entirely by mullahs and amins.

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The OGPU also paid special attention to strengthening the influence of Soviet power in the localities. It was also seen as an important direction for ending the struggle against the Soviet regime. In order to strengthen the influence of Soviet power, the courts began to be regulated. Because at that time the negligence of Soviet judicial officials forced the population to regularly apply to Sharia courts. For example, in December 1925, 129 cases were considered in the Sharia courts of the Dushanbe region of Tajikistan, and 56 in the Soviet courts [8]. Also in March 1926, due to the absence of people's courts in the Gissar region, the population turned to Kurbashi to resolve various issues [9]. Such cases led to the preservation of Kurbashi's reputation among the population. As a result of observations and studies of the OGPU, such aspects were identified and attempts were made to strengthen the Soviet power and strengthen its influence by regulating the judiciary.

The OGPU was well aware that it could not end the fight against Soviet power without improving relations between power systems and limiting the discriminatory policy of the military in relation to the local population and its robbery. The need to make some concessions on certain issues was also taken into account in order to arouse a benevolent attitude of the local population towards the Soviet government. OGPU spokesman P. "Relations between the police and the Red Army are bad and unacceptable," said Romanov. Warriors must be in close contact with each other. Their relationship should be friendly and sincere. Only then will the reputation of these units rise.

It should be noted that in several training sessions we missed situations. Instead of fighting, our squads are busy looting. This thing must be destroyed. These trophies did not belong to slaves, but to ordinary peasants. We must hand them over to the appropriate authorities" [10].

After 1926, the garrisons where the Red Army units were located were redistributed, and the intelligence work of the OGPU was strengthened in them. Efforts were made to involve the population in the fight against "basmachi" and to strengthen the police force in rural areas. Propaganda has been extended [11].

Thus, in 1925-1926, the OGPU used the following methods to stop the struggle against Soviet power in Central Asia:

1. strengthened intelligence service. Active and weak continuation of the armed movement in the republics and regions, leaders of the movement, their military status, social and national composition, the attitude of kurbashi, the conflict, the attitude of the population to Soviet reforms, the impact on the fighting of the Red Army, etc.;

2. the military units of the OGPU were involved in the cessation of hostilities. In many cases, the OGPU led the organization and conduct of hostilities;

3. also paid special attention to the issue of immigration. He also studied the reasons why people leave their homeland and what they do where they go. Therefore, the identification of emigration factors, their subsequent action and consequences was of great importance. By identifying these issues: 1) the importance of the influence of Soviet power on the ground was revealed, 2) mistakes and shortcomings in the activities of local governments were studied; 3) The study of the subsequent activities of the settlers was mainly aimed at people of great authority so that they could return and continue the struggle;

4. the troops of the OGPU took part in the suppression of uprisings in Central Asia, guarded the border areas. On November 6, 1926, the Border Department of the OGPU was reorganized and renamed the Main Directorate for the Protection of the Border and Troops of the OGPU.

5. the OGPU paid special attention to strengthening the influence of Soviet power. In particular, the activities of the military and law enforcement agencies of the Soviet government, their interaction and the activities of civil authorities were studied. Personnel in the governing bodies were cleared of opponents of the communist ideology, the attitude of military units to the local population and the attitude of the local population to the Red Army were analyzed. All of the above measures taken by the OGPU played a big role in suppressing all forms of struggle against Soviet power in Central Asia, namely ideological, armed uprisings, protests, demonstrations, and their participants were subjected to various punishments.

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