



TOWARDS A STRATEGIC DOCTRINE THAT SUPPORTS FUTURE INSTITUTIONAL PERFORMANCE IN COMBATING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM IN IRAQ

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Abstract:

Beyond any doubt, the impact of the phenomenon of international terrorism in Iraq over almost 20 years, alongside the material and moral damages it sustained, has forced political decision-makers to firmly believe that it is necessary to implement cautiously thought-out plans, options, and programs, both present and prospective, for the purpose of diminishing the threats to the national security system. Since terrorist organizations are able to form and achieve with modern instruments of power that justify criminal behavior in the context of extremist ideas and ideas they embrace that encompass all aspects of social life, the strategic imagination of the governing elites has actualized the character of the looming threat by these organizations.

It is said here that the Iraqi political decision maker must assess the dynamics of the movements of these groups according to a special strategic doctrine that is formed by utilizing the ins and outs of the experience of strategic/military performance in confronting terrorism. This experience will give him confidence in the stability of the strategic vision that confirms that what was employed was the effective action to confront the terrorist groups. Over a decade and a half, the truth was identified that Iraq, with all its institutions, especially the security ones, is capable of neutralizing the criminal acts of these groups. This is what the end of each confrontation reveals in a way that strengthened the idea of military victory for which all the components and capabilities of power were employed.

As long as the terrorist threat remains looming into the foreseeable future, this requires everyone to present a number of presentations that must all be aligned in the form of strategies that create action to confront this threat. Or let us say that all institutions, at their various levels and functions, are concerned with adopting a future strategic performance that is proactive in the actions of extremist groups. Then we say that we must have an institutional strategic doctrine specific to weakening and managing/resolving the threat of criminal acts, because this doctrine will be - without a doubt - the guide for the work of the security leadership in combating the wave of terrorism that is active from time to time in our country. Then the elites involved in the confrontation will be armed with a high-tech strategic doctrine capable of quickly defeating these new "urban" terrorists by unleashing the full power of our security technologies against them, even if in the short term at least we have to trade some freedoms.

Keywords: Strategic Doctrine, Institutional Performance, International Terrorism, Counterterrorism, National Security

INTRODUCTION:

The issue of terrorism in Iraq is of great importance to many researchers and scholars, especially in the fields of political and military sciences. This is due to the gravity of its consequences on the political and security reality and the fact that it has led to the stability and entrenchment of its effectiveness as a criminal activity whose negative impact has affected the lives of Iraqis, causing the loss of their security to the point that it seems unattainable and that achieving it remains hostage to idealistic contents that philosophy, with its fixed vision, is unable to decipher. Thus, the reality of our national security has become, for years, imprisoned by the impact of the phenomenon of terrorism, whose perpetrators realized that the reality of the Iraqi people under its hammer will render them helpless in their political performance. This means that international terrorism has succeeded in legitimizing its criminal acts when it sought to establish an existence that would enable it to destroy the psyche of Iraqi society, when it exerted that effort through the destruction of property,

the violation of sanctities, and the desecration of sacred places. In view of this, our elites must realize the value of confrontation by adopting a special strategic doctrine that governs the power of its influence on the principle of decisions taken and implemented to neutralize the threat of terrorist groups.

PROBLEM OF THE STUDY:

The persistence of the phenomenon of terrorism in Iraq requires political elites to be guided by a security strategy that serves as a strategic guide aimed at reducing the damage caused by its destructive activity. This guide, according to the perspective of the language of political analysis, guarantees the formulation and implementation of strategic decisions, because, according to the contents of the Iraqi constitution, the methods of formulation and implementation are governed by the convictions, beliefs and inclinations of decision-makers, which ultimately leads to rationalizing the strategies of institutions with their various references towards preventive and therapeutic strategies aimed at preserving Iraqi national security. Here it seems necessary for us to point out that the strategic doctrine has been reduced to ensuring its framework of successful legal measures through which our political elites weaken the dynamics of the equations of change that terrorism relies on to achieve its vital goals. In light of this, we are here dealing with a topic that will point to a cognitive debate that depends on the methods of formulating such a doctrine, which we see as worthy of being taken/imposed upon us as a society that was, still is, and perhaps will continue to suffer from the impact of the terrorist phenomenon. Here we say that the task of formulation is sought by raising an important central question: What are the reasons for formulating a strategic doctrine that would be a reference guide for strategic decision-makers to employ in limiting the activity of terrorism and its disastrous consequences for Iraqi society.

IMPORTANCE OF THE STUDY:

This study reveals the importance of the strategic doctrine for dealing with the phenomenon of terrorism and its consequences in Iraq, which represents the only way to move towards a secure and stable society. This doctrine will bridge the gap between the political obstacles that stand in the way of issuing a collective political/strategic decision and the weakness of our ability to employ our power capabilities to implement that decision. It provides those in charge of governance with the methods and approaches that allow leaders in official and unofficial institutions, especially security institutions, to implement preventive measures collectively in a way that enables us to believe that the direct relationship between the strategic doctrine and the fight against terrorism is based on a future institution that absolutely does not allow for the inverse of such a relationship.

HYPOTHESIS OF THE STUDY:

The current study proves that the strategic doctrine will adapt the capabilities of the Iraqi force and align its material and moral components towards achieving a future institutional performance capable of confronting terrorism and limiting its impact through preventive legal mechanisms and measures that enhance the value of the Iraqi state as a model with a great ability to manage the philosophy of change related to containing the activity of terrorist groups and rationalizing their plans towards settling them, not just managing them.

DESIGN OF THE STUDY:

Our study relied primarily on the inductive approach, one of the advantages of which is that it provides the researcher with multiple opportunities for reflection, contemplation, and examination of the correlations between the study's variables, as well as for accurate scientific deductions. We also utilized the analytical approach, which provided us with a scientific vision based on providing a sense of the dynamics of the avenues it establishes for presenting practical opinions that enhance the soundness of any scientific study.

STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY:

In order to demonstrate the importance of the study, and to understand the problems raised regarding the reality of the subject as a research problem that requires scientifically proving the hypothesis of the correlation between its variables, our study, after the introduction, is divided into three interconnected sections, in which I analyzed the validity of our assumptions. The first section examined and analyzed the reasons for formulating a strategic doctrine specific to combating terrorism in Iraq. The second section addressed the effectiveness of the strategic doctrine as an entry point for sustainable institutional performance that guarantees Iraqi national security. As for the third section analyzed the impact of strategic doctrine on modeling the strategic performance of security institutions in combating terrorist groups in Iraq. We then concluded with a summary of the ideas discussed in the text.

SECTION ONE: RATIONALE FOR DEVELOPING A SPECIALIZED STRATEGIC DOCTRINE TO COUNTER INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM IN IRAQ.

First of all, doctrine is discussed in the general form by its dominant idea. It is not confined only to the religious sphere, but its idea denotes a variety of factors that reveal the essence of its impact on the beliefs, perceptions and consciousness of individuals in society/state decision-makers. It is divided into political doctrine (ideology), military doctrine, legal doctrine, strategic doctrine and others. Then we claim that doctrine is a public policy, its modes of which are decided upon by the political system as to what it politically believes, and it is a revealer of its directions based on its interpretation of the nation's history, present and future¹.

In view of this, we can say that the strategic doctrine is a major part of the concept of doctrine in its comprehensive sense, through which the state seeks its goal and reaches its vital objectives. This is consistent with the definition of (Abdul Wahab Al-Kayali), who defined it as (a group of ideas and technical and tactical methods specific to developing

¹ Anderson, J. (2013). The Making of Public Policy, translated by Dr. Amer Al-Kubaisi, 5th ed., Dar Al-Masirah for Publishing and Distribution, Amman. p. 55

an effective plan to achieve a basic strategic objective)². Walid Abdel Hay defines it implicitly as: It is a group of ideas, hopes, and methods that are organized according to a specific framework, producing strategic thinking dominated by unity of awareness and performance, to become a strategic doctrine that develops according to goals and activities, arriving at an integrated structure that is the title for every position or action until ideological thinking becomes a reference by which goals are measured and achieved³. This, in general, is consistent with the definition of strategic doctrine as a set of principles established to be followed or adopted as a political doctrine that expresses the official government policy regarding foreign and strategic affairs⁴.

In light of this, the doctrine, in terms of strategy (perception, planning, and performance), occupies an important position in the state's comprehensive strategy, not because it represents the source and summary of objectives, but because it represents the reference in which strategic performance is formed. It is, without dispute, its spirit and incubator. If we go beyond the narrow meaning of strategy in its military sense, as defined by Clausewitz, then strategy is not valid as a title and meaning without a philosophy that frames it and puts an end to the overlap of objectives and the forms of their disclosure, just as it pushes it to be possible to achieve after plans are arranged to employ the components of material and moral strength in favor of achieving the objectives⁵. Therefore, we say that our country is interested in such a doctrine that enables it to manage and settle the momentum of the risks it is exposed to. This constitutes the starting point for answering the question (What are the reasons for preparing and building a special strategic doctrine that is always concerned with combating terrorism?).

It is no exaggeration to say that Iraq is one of the countries in the world most harmed by the phenomenon of international terrorism. What the reality of the years after 2003 reveals is that the country has become a stage for the criminal operations of terrorist groups that have begun to entrench themselves in strength due to internal and external conflicts, the results of which have been the continuation of a state of security instability, which has ultimately served the interests of others who have never been satisfied with the idea of a safe and stable Iraq, as they realize that it is killing their own interests, and as a result our country has paid great losses in lives, property and institutions. Perhaps what makes the matter more ferocious and frightening is that the act of terrorism has not ended yet, as its incubators are still searching for a security loophole to activate again. This situation makes us declare frankly by saying that our present and future remain exposed to the terrorist danger with the continuation of three forms of humiliation: First, since 2003 until this moment, Iraq, with all its institutions, has not found approaches to building a strategy that helps its leaders and sons to approach the edge of thinking about the national self that can be adopted as a criterion for measuring interests and goals together. We, as a state, are still begging for visions and positions to protect its existence, and even to maintain its security from others.

This is contrary to what is imagined and reasonable, especially since we are in the second decade of the twenty-first century, and we represent a country that possesses a deep heritage and capabilities beyond imagination. Second: Despite all the violations that Iraqi national security has been subjected to internally and externally, and with all that has been done in this direction, the outcome remains unconvincing. This is not because terrorism is still present, and the region is still replete with tremendous changes that negatively impact Iraq, which has become an arena for measuring their effects and perhaps a construction arena for their various repercussions. Rather, it is because its people are still below the threshold of building a real strategy for it, and they were also below the threshold of finding a model for managing its multiple files.

Finally, despite all the efforts made to develop the visions proposed to preserve Iraqi national security since 2003, the advancement of strategic performance has still not reached the threshold of a trade-off between action and effective change on the ground. Even if Iraqis consider their situation after the events of Mosul in 2014, they find that their efforts over the past years have been in vain, and that they remain at the starting point, neither moving nor effective, despite all the institutions they have established and the funds they have spent. The realities of Iraqi national security continue to be affected by every variable, and remain incapable of influencing. This is the secret of its permissibility⁶ by terrorist groups that have become deeply involved in the state of increasing use of their criminal activities in the period after 2003, where its incidents and victims have increased significantly, until Iraq has become the evidence on which indicators of the increasing effectiveness and spread of international terrorism are measured. The reality guides us - according to what has been indicated by many studies by research centers specializing in terrorism - that the situation in Iraq and many countries will remain a visible field for the effectiveness of the role of terrorist groups, as long as they have found in political violence the best means to coerce opponents simply because they have learned that this tactic works⁷.

² Al-Kayali, A. (2009). Encyclopedia of Politics, Vol. 4, 5th ed., Arab Foundation for Studies and Publishing, Beirut. pp. 135-136

³ Abdel Hay, W. (2002) Introduction to Future Studies in Political Science, International Center for Political Studies, Beirut. p. 19.

⁴ Al-Shahri, A. (2003) The Development of Military Doctrines and Strategies, 1st ed., King Fahd National Library, Riyadh. p. 64.

⁵ Al-Ammar, M. (2001). Goal Creation and Defining: A Study of Strategic Constants, Journal of International Studies, Issue 41, Center for International Studies, University of Baghdad, Baghdad. p. 8.

⁶ Al-Ammar, M. and Saleh, Sh. (2015). Iraqi National Security and Counter-Terrorism, Journal of International Studies, Issue 61, Center for Strategic and International Studies, University of Baghdad, Baghdad. pp. 29-30.

⁷ Muro, D. et, al. (2019). When Does Terrorism Work?, Routledge Studies in Extremism and Democracy, London. p1.

Then we say that we - like most countries - must have a reference guide that includes legal materials that have a binding, supreme character, and that provide comprehensive reference information whose mission is to facilitate the provision of technical assistance to those responsible for formulating and implementing strategic decisions aimed at combating terrorism. This guide will serve as a strategic doctrine formulating such important strategic decisions⁸. Or let us say that the continuation of the signs of the terrorist phenomenon obliges us to adopt a special strategic doctrine whose goal - according to the logic of political analysis - is to prepare a collective institutional project to combat it, since the political work specific to confrontation remains impossible in the absence of a system of perceptions and principles in the shadow of which strategic decisions are formed, which are ultimately outcomes formulated and shaped by the strength of the strategic doctrine inherent in the strength of the will of the nation, the political leadership, the work programs of political institutions, and the strength of the strategy adopted in the act of confrontation⁹.

In view of this, we are concerned with formulating a strategic doctrine for combating terrorism, the symbolism of which is fortified and the preventive measures it contains are firmly established in the 2005 Constitution, which emphasized, in a number of instances, the necessity of confronting terrorism and limiting its impact. Its preamble went on to anticipate ways of confrontation, hoping that "terrorism will not deter us from moving forward to build a state of law" through the permanent necessity of "defusing terrorism." In line with this, the two paragraphs (first and second of Article 7) came successively to confirm that "every entity or approach that adopts racism, terrorism, excommunication, or sectarian cleansing, or incites, paves the way for, glorifies, promotes, or justifies it, is prohibited, and "the state is committed to fighting terrorism in all its forms, and works to protect its lands from being a headquarters, passageway, or arena for its activity."¹⁰

The language of logical analysis of the paragraphs of the Constitution indicates the stability of the idea of confrontation, which obliges the Iraqi decision-maker to limit terrorist activity when he considers it a selective phenomenon that perpetuates a state of anxiety as a result of the repeated violent acts associated with it, which are linked to political, religious, social, and other reasons¹¹. The confrontation mechanism requires our elites to formulate a special strategic doctrine that will serve as a guiding standard for combating terrorism, after including it in an integrated set of activities, techniques, and strategies that the government uses through security and defense institutions to confront terrorism militarily as a rapid measure, or reformatively through a package of economic and political measures aimed at resolving problems related to weak development in all fields, or intellectually through awareness and advice, and all of these represent solid measures undertaken by all state institutions and their involvement in any real treatment of terrorism and its causes. In parallel with these strategies, the decision-maker must adopt measures that in turn support the idea of following policies to curb terrorism in its homeland before it appears by emphasizing the importance of successful policies to enforce the law and not leaving power in its democratic institutional concept to the branch¹².

Here we will have the ability to generate a society that symbolically interacts with the outcomes of the strategic doctrine in its adoption of central strategic decisions (strategic performance) with the aim of emptying extremist groups of their terrorism. The situation requires our elites at all levels to employ the outcomes of technological, informational and intelligence progress and harness them to build a society of the state of citizenship in which the options for combating terrorism are strengthened ideologically - far from narrow entrenchments. The evidence for this is that these outcomes served the strategic doctrine in the countries of the civilized world in their orientation to acquire accelerating returns and emulate the idea of the stability of the reproduction of societies changing at a tremendous speed, to benefit from the outcomes of progress towards the philosophy of positive change, and to confront terrorism by narrowing the margin of maneuver in reaching the strategic goals that it believes in their legitimacy, as indicated by the employment of the same outcomes through the emergence of a new threat that carries within it great risks represented in proving its ability to invest the technological process in selecting vital targets in terrorist attacks. This represents the nature of the goals that terrorist groups set for themselves, which they seek through the local and international threat that crosses borders towards the societies of countries that are not secure in terms of security¹³. This is what makes us fearful because what Iraq has suffered until today, and will continue to suffer until tomorrow, is summarized in a large part by the scourge of terrorism, which does not require treatment and dealing, but rather confrontation and fighting¹⁴.

Based on the above, we can say with certainty that the strategic doctrine for combating terrorism is important in the long term because it works to securitize the terrorist threat, which means raising it from a primarily criminal problem that can be addressed by the police and the judiciary according to the so-called "criminal justice model" to a fundamental

⁸ Gottselig, G. & Gleeson, P. (2003). *Suppressing the Financing of Terrorism: A Guide for Legislative Drafting*, International Monetary Fund, Washington. p. 7.

⁹ Fahmi, A. (2009). *Introduction to the Study of Strategy: the importance of doctrine in the strategic field*, 1st ed., Baghdad University Press, Baghdad. pp. 17 ff.

¹⁰ Iraqi Council of Representatives, *Constitution of the Republic of Iraq*, Baghdad, 2006, pp. 1-6.

¹¹ Hartleb, F. & Wolves, L. (2020). *The New Terrorism of Right-Wing Single Actors*, Springer Nature Switzerland AG, Cham. p29

¹² Eid, M. (2006). *Contributions of International Institutions and Organizations in Combating Terrorism and Maritime Piracy*, Publications of the Naif Arab Academy for Security Sciences, Riyadh. p. 148.

¹³ Lehr, P. (2019). *Counter-Terrorism Technologies: A Critical Assessment*, Springer Nature Switzerland AG, Cham. p1.

¹⁴ Fayyad, A. (2016). *Iraq and Other Issues*, Political Issues Magazine, Issues 45-46, College of Political Science, Al-Nahrain University, Baghdad. p. A.

challenge to our state, to its political system, to the fabric of our society and to our way of life. The advantage of this type of approach in the future is that it gives us confidence that the fight can be transferred to terrorist enemies and their external bases and incubators in other countries after agreement with them. Here, the strategic doctrine will be a reason to establish strategic alliances/relationships that use security institutions, especially the army and its associated formations, to maintain national security from outside the state's borders without any contradiction with the constitutional restrictions regulating the work of those forces¹⁵.

SECTION TWO: THE EFFECTIVENESS OF STRATEGIC DOCTRINE AS AN APPROACH TO SUSTAINING INSTITUTIONAL PERFORMANCE TO GUARANTEE IRAQI NATIONAL SECURITY IN A TURBULENT REGIONAL ENVIRONMENT.

If we seek the idea of the former US Secretary of State (Henry Kissinger) who confirmed that "when every country creates its strategy, it has a number of alternatives and options to create its strategy, but the decisive choice and final decision depend on the strategic doctrine that it adopts. The role of the strategic doctrine is summarized in diagnosing potential dangers, determining methods to confront them, and choosing possible and feasible goals and the means to achieve them."¹⁶ And employing it in the service of what was read - above - of ideas, we will arrive at an institutional working formula whose gist is summarized as the Iraqi decision-maker must adopt a strategic doctrine specific to combating terrorism that allows him to confront and fight by adopting effective tactics to legitimize the act of settling terrorist risks, not just managing them, far from the options of reaction that represented a standard for testing confrontation with the enemy after presenting many sacrifices that made Iraq after 2003, with its current strategic performance, represent the model (1) in the world that bears the burden of reconstructing its existence through construction and confronting challenges, especially those of the type of global challenges (combating terrorism), so that the doctrine of combat is equal to the doctrine of construction, and as much as that fact represents the first distinguishing characteristic, it also represents a study problem that needs to be addressed¹⁷. By adopting such a doctrine, which serves as domestic legislation to combat international terrorism, and which is expected to be formulated to activate preventive measures that serve the national security system and convey an ideal image of fulfilling our obligations under the international agreements to which we are a party¹⁸. Here specifically, we will draw a true reality about covering up the narcissism of our role as an active state in its regional and international environment, far from the language of defamation that describes us as a state in whose arena international terrorist activity is perpetuated. The strategic doctrine aims to encourage Iraqi elites in adopting total institutional performance, particularly security institutions, towards the implementation of the Anti-Terrorism Law. Signed into force by the Presidency in 2005, the law was based on the damage caused by the activities of terror which destabilize national unity and the pursuit of a federal, pluralistic, democratic system of rule of law. The law aims to suppress terrorist activities and limit dealings with those who engage in them¹⁹. Then, preserving our national security from terrorist attacks will be the criterion for the work of the strategic doctrine that allows the makers and implementers of confrontation strategies/tactics to model the performance of all institutions towards choosing the preventive measures indicated by the criminal law in the laws (penalties and trial procedures for preventing and suppressing terrorism in Iraq).

The matter even extends to a supra-local level when confrontation measures begin to enhance the flow of cooperation between Iraq and its regional surroundings in the areas of early warning in the joint tracking of the activity of terrorist groups and the exchange of information that requires an effective joint contribution in the fields of border security, customs and intelligence work. It may come to the conclusion of agreements that would be a prelude to establishing strategic relations with the surrounding countries - which have always represented an arena for the launch of terrorist groups - towards not providing shelter to terrorists and preventing their entry or infiltration or allowing them to train or arm them in addition to their methods of work and financing, and this will allow without the slightest doubt a joint institutional work for the perpetrators, allowing them to consult on an integrated field security/intelligence project that allows the parties to view data on terrorists before carrying out any terrorist operation against the security and safety of Iraqi national security²⁰, here we can say that this strategic doctrine is the basis for determining the strategic perception and its directions²¹.

This will allow us to say that our strategic doctrine has proven the strength of our national security when it has secured for itself an institutional performance that seeks preventive measures with a national, regional and international dimension to combat terrorism. Then Iraq, with its strategic/security doctrine, will be the maker of the confrontation action, especially when it establishes among its neighbors the idea that the current threat of terrorist attacks is a threat to the security of all. With the development of technology, the danger will increase more than before, because the

¹⁵ Lehr, P. (2019). Counter-Terrorism Technologies: A Critical Assessment, Springer Nature Switzerland AG, Cham.

¹⁶ Kissinger, H. (1987). American Strategic Doctrine and US Diplomacy, translated by Hazem Taleb Mushtaq, Wasit Publishing House, Baghdad. pp. 45-46.

¹⁷ Al-Ammar, M. (2011). The New Iraqi Military Doctrine: A Study of its Formation Systems, Political Issues Magazine, Issues 24-25, Al-Nahrain University, College of Political Science, Baghdad. p. 5.

¹⁸ Shukri, M. (1982). Introduction to Public International Law in Times of Peace, 1st ed., Dar Al Fikr, Damascus. p. 51.

¹⁹ Al-Ali, Z. (2007). Anti-Terrorism Law No. (13) of 2005, 1st ed., Arab Generation Library, Mosul. p. 5.

²⁰ Iraqi National Security Strategy 2007-2020, 1st ed, Iraqi National Security Advisory, Baghdad, 2007, pp. 8-9.

²¹ Al-Yassin, D. (2001). The Philosophy of American Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Era, Strategic Studies Series, Center for International Studies, University of Baghdad, Issue 21. p. 36.

terrorist act today may not be carried out by a large group of active individuals other than states, since the individual has the ability to threaten the societal/national security of a state/several states at the same time. As evidenced by the fact that cyberspace has proven that extremist terrorism represents a significant regional threat, the Chinese war theorist Sun Tzu's assumption is true: "Kill one, terrorize 10,000." The twenty-first century therefore guides us that we no longer need an organized group to generate this terrorism; one individual is sufficient at the present time²². This situation remains possible, while acknowledging that terrorism can be effective in achieving tactical returns, even while it is ineffective in achieving strategic goals²³.

Here, we argue that strategic doctrine in this area remains highly valuable because it presents us with three powerful variables to our credit:

1. It gives decision-makers in the Iraqi state the ability to confront terrorism through a proactive strategic action before terrorist attacks occur, and even a highly effective and efficient reaction even when they occur. This is due to the integration of the institutional strategic performance of all bodies regarding the confrontation process because - after realizing the danger strategically - it provided them with strategic planning as an integrated process through which the state's message and its objectives are determined in this field, after it analyzed the internal environment and identified the points of weakness and strength, and read the reality of the external environment to determine the opportunities and threats it faces in order to formulate strategic decisions that guarantee the achievement of the set objectives.
2. It presents before us effective strategic plans for confronting terrorist groups in the future—meaning it assists us in anticipating the future of counterterrorism, especially after our security institutions have firmly tightened their grip on all internal sources of terrorism, and our governments have begun cooperating on external counterterrorism measures with neighboring countries. At that point, the strategic doctrine will serve as the best tool for formulating scenarios based on the outputs of security strategic planners' thinking and their projections within a practical, applicable framework. This will grant us the strength to confront and overcome terrorist challenges after we have fully mobilized our capabilities across all institutions.
3. Most important of all, the successful strategic performance of the confrontation will have value dimensions that reflect, through its employment, the spirit of the strategic doctrine that achieved it, in terms of awareness and planning. Then, our political elites will have the process of anticipating the positive consequences (victory in the confrontation). This strategic performance is the product of a joint effort of an integrated institutional performance that worked with all its might to translate the strategic plans in accordance with the comprehensive view of the state's work and conduct, and in a way that enables strategic decision-makers and implementers to respond quickly and adapt to the unexpected and rapid changes in the internal and external environments. Here, strategic performance will not be merely a re-arrangement of options or making changes in important fundamental and essential matters, but rather it is the creation of phenomena that frame the general principle and provide it with the necessary ability to formulate its own measures. This is why we always see the behavior of leaders taking the form of initiative in their presentation of strategic solutions or the form of skilled performance in achieving goals²⁴.

Finally, the effectiveness of the strategic doctrine as a framework guaranteeing Iraqi national security is achieved through the establishment of specialized institutions assigned the following tasks:

1. Mutual support for national security issues between the Iraqi Joint Forces, the Iraqi Police Forces, and the multinational forces.
2. Command and control systems, including the Ministerial Authority for National Security, the National Intelligence Coordination Authority, and the Ministerial Authority for National Security.
3. Coordination mechanisms through the National Joint Operations Center, the Intelligence Analysis Center, the Joint Planning Center, and the Provincial Operations Coordination Center²⁵.

SECTION THREE: THE IMPACT OF STRATEGIC DOCTRINE ON MODELING THE STRATEGIC PERFORMANCE OF SECURITY INSTITUTIONS IN COMBATING THE ACTIVITY OF TERRORIST GROUPS IN IRAQ.

Realistic evidence indicates that Iraqi national security has become confined to military doctrine, to the point that it seems to be the most important field that we always aspire to develop and improve its inputs and outputs with the development of local and international circumstances and conditions. However, this does not contain a flaw or a point of weakness that should be attributed to our elites, as terrorism has the ability to adapt to the development of international circumstances and its strategies mimic the nature of the desired objectives, even in the most secure and stable countries. The terrorist acts in the United Kingdom, France, and before them the United States are only evidence of this, so that the military doctrine, due to the wave of terrorism that has occurred, represents an intellectual approach

²² Florian Hartleb, Op, Cit, p1

²³ Diego Muro and Others, Op, Cit , p1.

²⁴ Al-Ammar, M. (2012). Self-Disputes: Can Democracy Control the Relationship between Strategy and Change: The United States of America as a Model? 1st ed., Al-Ghufran Printing Library, Baghdad. p. 111.

²⁵ Al-Ammar, M. (2012). Self-Disputes: Can Democracy Control the Relationship between Strategy and Change: The United States of America as a Model? 1st ed., Al-Ghufran Printing Library, Baghdad. p. 12

that summarizes the doctrine of the largest part of the political doctrines of the systems of many countries, even the most advanced ones.

This situation imposes on us, as a country that has lost much of its infrastructure and human resources due to terrorism, to make its security structure entirely linked to military performance and military doctrine, which, as a content, was not independent in itself at first glance, meaning that it is no longer a comprehensive reference for strategic performance despite the vitality of its position in it. It is part of the political philosophy of the state and takes from it its content and directions of construction, and it is also the one that expresses it, which makes the military doctrine represent a subject with a large framework that extends vertically from the highest political organizations in the state and gradually reaches the lowest military levels until individuals reach²⁶. Therefore, there is no harm in the military doctrine abbreviating the action of the strategic doctrine when it works to establish the foundations for assessing, managing and settling risks as a prelude to protecting national security, especially its critical infrastructure in particular, and in all areas related to the various state institutions. This, without the slightest doubt, will give the strategic decision-maker a future vision that goes beyond the current threat posed by terrorist groups called the extremist entity (ISIS)²⁷.

With the seriousness of what was presented, we say that the strategic doctrine will remain the most effective guarantee to correct the inefficiency of some general policies of a military nature related to combating terrorism. Its effectiveness pushes all state institutions, especially the security ones, to do their utmost to provide an environment hostile to the survival of extremist groups. This means that the strategic doctrine will work to frame (model) the work of security institutions by obligating them to activate the counter-terrorism policy that brings together a series of political, legal and security tools to the extent that it makes political violence ineffective and influential in essence. Rather, more importantly, the strategic doctrine makes both governments and societies affected by terrorism, including Iraq, have a special interest in taking a close look at the issue of its effectiveness as a permanent danger that always requires confronting it by security institutions as well as others in society²⁸.

As far as the security institutions are concerned, which are responsible for the task of combating terrorism as a security and societal function, their impact is summed up in military performance with a strategic security character, guided by plans and tactics issued by the strategic decision-making elites to combat waves of terrorist groups using the sources of power available in the short and long term²⁹. The result of this was that the security institutions, with all their formations, proved the truth of what they believe in, a military doctrine based on the unity of the path to defending Iraq as a comprehensive societal unit, regardless of its ethnicities, races, sects, and denominations, so that the concern of those forces is to regain the land and protect civilians during military operations. Therefore, we say that the unity of the military doctrine must be a main entry point from which it is hoped to formulate a strategic doctrine that works to model the performance of the security forces towards a higher goal related to the continuation of the approach of military action that guarantees the maintenance of joint military operations to protect the liberated areas, because this means that the government, with its security institutions, is close to its citizens to the extent that it does not allow the creation of another ISIS. The dynamism of operational guidance in such areas means that the security institutions have reached the threshold of optimal practices that qualify them for military victory, far from exposing civilians to danger with every wave of confrontation³⁰.

Therefore, we say that the strategic doctrine for combating the wave of terrorism will highlight the need to develop the combat military doctrine of the Iraqi forces and security forces, to employ them jointly and in a unified combat performance format, to maintain security and order in Iraq by waging war, in cooperation with international coalition forces, against the forces of rebellion and terrorism, and to protect the land of Iraq and its people. This situation applies to the military performance of all security institutions' forces, headed by the Counter-Terrorism Service, which has been considered, since the fall of the dictatorial regime, the most prominent Iraqi military formations, the most active in fighting terrorist organizations. It was described as an armed national force, whose administrative and field work is regulated by the Counter-Terrorism Service Law No. (31) of 2016, which was issued by the Iraqi Council of Representatives. What gives its military effectiveness strength is its independence from the Ministries of Interior and Defense, as it is directly linked to the office of the Commander-in-Chief. However, at the same time, it participates in its military work with all security formations that have committed to the Counter-Terrorism Law No. (13) of 2005, which legally indicated the necessity of adopting joint preventive measures in combating extremist thought and fighting terrorist organizations. This has been proven in practice, as the apparatus, along with the security forces of various military formations such as the Federal Police, the Iraqi Army forces, and the Popular Mobilization Forces factions, with the support of the international coalition forces, was able to militarily defeat the terrorist organization once and for all from Iraq. As a result of the victories achieved by the apparatus, in addition to its excellence in organization and training,

²⁶ Munim Al-Ammar, *America and the Dialectic of Confrontation*, Strategic Studies Series, Issue 42, Center for International Studies, University of Baghdad, 2002, Baghdad, p. 15.

²⁷ Peter Lehr, Op, Cit, p1.

²⁸ Diego Muro and Others, Op, cit, p1.

²⁹ Al-Mayali, H. & Rasan, M. (2017). *The Role of Strategic Planning in Combating Terrorism: The Ministry of Interior as a Model*, Al-Ghari Journal of Economic and Administrative Sciences, Issue 2, College of Administration and Economics, University of Kufa, Kufa. p. 259

³⁰ Group of Researchers, *Civilian Protection Policies and Practices: Lessons from Iraqi Forces' Operations Against ISIS in Populated Areas*, Center for Civilians in Conflict, Washington, 2019, p. 1

the apparatus was ranked by Western circles several times as the fifth most powerful military apparatus in the Middle East. On November 14, 2016, international media reported that retired General Arthur Denaro, former head of the British Royal Military Academy Sandhurst and advisor to the British Ministry of Defense for Middle East affairs, said, "The Iraqi army deserves this title because it will have liberated large areas equivalent to the area of five Arab countries and more than Kuwait, the Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain and Jordan combined."³¹

Therefore, the strategic doctrine is a necessary necessity to accomplish the tasks of the apparatus in the field of combating international terrorism, because, according to the duties assigned to it in this regard, it is the most realistic in resolving many of the problems that determine the defense policy and the nature and type of current and future threats, especially internal ones, especially those related to combating terrorism and insurgency. This represents the basis for building the apparatus as a professional national military institution that represents all segments of the Iraqi people and is part of the proper use of the capabilities of the Iraqi force, which will ultimately enter into the heart of building and developing the force in a manner that is commensurate with the potential threats. A sound understanding of the future enemy, both domestically and regionally, namely terrorism, prompted decision-makers to form a general command for counter-terrorism forces, represented by quality, quantity, training, armament, and advanced equipment, equipped with its own air force to support and transport it, enabling it to cover the geographical area of Iraq from the far north to the far south. This is a unique force in the regional environment. This ultimately supports the strategic vision based on the need to focus on the strategic doctrine as a framework that supports the effectiveness of the new military doctrine supported by institutional values and organization, especially since the central values and their essence lie in the recognition by members of the Iraqi joint forces of the principles of service, loyalty, elected civilian authority, professionalism, non-interference in local political affairs, and the belief that the joint forces have no role in the process of transferring power. It also includes national unity and national civil-military leadership, which will inspire our security forces to achieve success in carrying out their missions. It also includes representation, integrity, information security, transparency, and, finally, cost-efficiency³², this is the essence of the strategic doctrine, which must be a title that highlights the value of the homeland above all else.

CONCLUSION:

The Iraqi political decision-maker's adherence to the strategic doctrine for confronting the imminent threat posed by terrorist groups means that there is a sound vision that recognizes the magnitude of the risks posed by the phenomenon of international terrorism to national/community security. This doctrine will even motivate strategic decisions that reveal a preemptive plan of action for criminal acts before they occur. We can then say that this doctrine has had a significant impact on strategic performance, aiming to mitigate the threat, manage it, and perhaps, to a large extent, resolve it. Therefore, it is no harm in saying that the strategic doctrine is the secret that reveals to us how the security institutions have succeeded in their tactics to confront the wave of terrorism. Indeed, it provides the legal and legitimate cover for taking the necessary measures to combat it, in accordance with the dictates of Iraq's anti-terrorism law. This ultimately serves the idea of developing strong, highly prepared security forces capable of confronting takfiri organizations. Furthermore, it will contribute to maintaining security and stability, protecting lives and property, and preserving Iraqi human rights and fundamental freedoms.

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³¹ Shabib, A. (2019). The Counter-Terrorism Service: The Strike Force in Iraq: Founding Objectives and Legal Determinants, Kitabab website, 10/12/2019: <https://kitabab.com/2019/10/12/281891/>.

³² Al-Ammar, M. Military Doctrine: A Study of its Formation Systems, previously mentioned source, pp. 15-17.

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