THE POLITICS OF UNITED NATIONS ARMS CONTROL AND TERRORISM IN THE CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

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Received:	June 26th 2021	States and other organised terrorist non-state actors are emboldened by ratification and verification lacuna in arms control agreements leading to their unabated violation of arms acquisition. This is aggravated too, by the weak enforcement mechanism for the control of arms proliferation in the global system. This paper x-rayed the politics of United Nations arms control and terrorism in the contemporary international system. The appropriation of Kenneth Waltz's (1979) State-centric realism theory was aptly deployed to underpin the arguments. Waltz's realist thought argues that the highest goal for a state is its existential perpetuation, hence, the need for pro security posture, and less of moral principle in the anarchic international system is underscored. The paper sees the emergence and continuity of terrorism as consequences of state pursuance of hegemonic status in the context of national interests and security even as it identified some pitfalls of the UN's efforts towards arms control. With logical sequence of data from secondary sources, content analyses were used to analyze the data. It was found that the most critical impediment to arms control, is the politics surrounding compliance and the focus on profiteering which the big5 state actors and private arm manufacturers are complicit and culpable. The paper therefore recommended among other things that to effectively control arms and terrorists spread, the UN should appropriate manufacturers license under its purview of supervision and escalate its watchdog role over the supply chain of weaponry from the point of manufacture to the end user.
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INTRODUCTION

The emergence of modern terrorism may be said to owe some of its fecundity to several factors including the inability of the UN to hold defaulters of its arms control resolutions to a practical account. This incapacity is not helped by the emergence of new state actors like NATO, ECOMOG, regional organizations and a corresponding number and proportion of non-state actors like Al-Qaeda, ISIS, ISWAP and the Somalia Pirates. While this development is widely entrenched due to state pursuance of hegemonic status in the contexts of self-help and national security, there has been a matching proliferation in the number, nature and types of threats to transnational security and world peace. Consequently, the dimension, mobilization and activation of security threats across national borders have been expanded, made complex and fragmented. The dimensions to transnational security threats are subsumed in the intricate, yet interactive web between individual states and between states and non-state actors in a manner that is characterized by an entrenched and uncompromising interests. These interests, are sometimes pursued without world peace in mind. At the heart of states pursuance of self-interest is the question of armament detrimental to world peace. Although international mechanism of the UN like Strategic Arms Limitation Treaties (SALTs) and Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties (STARTs) tries to emasculate states arm greed through arms control, however, states foreign policies, especially the US Middle East focus has reinforced issues which in the realists' perspective underscores an international arrangement where power and its demonstrations are the professed language of states in the international system. In interstate relations, arms build-up and production capability is a language of deterrence to maintain power position.

While this position is maintained, some of its lose ends and odds in the context of transnational terrorism is posing threats for national and global security. In the light of the above, Umoh (2020) says that terrorism is state-centric since it emanates from injustice and disorder in the state. In fact, terrorism emanate from actors, persons,

entities or organisations of the state and non-state. Global terrorism includes the internationalization of terrorist acts, according to reports from the Global Terrorism Index (GTI), including the development of global terrorist networks that use illegal violent attacks to gain global attention (GTI, 2018). Complex terrorist activities are correlated with global terrorist networks. At the state level, global terrorism includes the use by one state of unlawful aggressive means against the other (Williamson, 2009). Global terrorism has acquired a scholarly interest in foreign affairs since the attacks on the World Trade Centre in the United States on 9 September 2011. According to the Department for Disarmament Affairs of the United Nations (1991 :3), the Charter of the United Nations embodied principles and provided a forum to discourage state {terrorism} or war as an instrument of policy between nations. The first of those principles was the commitment to "save succeeding generations from the scourge of war". Moreover, within the framework of the Charter, the world organization offered opportunities for member states to develop new forums, methods and international machinery of cooperation for international peace and security. To help achieve that goal, the Charter entrusted the General Assembly and the Security Council with the responsibility of dealing with questions of arms control and disarmament.

With the entry of terrorism in the nuclear age, many scholars have asked if arm control is effective, where then do terrorists purchase the state of the art weapon? And if the Charter had envisaged arms limitation and disarmament as elements in the progressive establishment of an international security system, how comes, terrorism is proliferated. In fact, International Crisis Group (2019) suggested (from the increase in terror groupings), that terrorist acts have not abated in recent times; instead, it has persisted in various complex forms. While Koulik and Kokoski (1994) examined arm control in the post-cold war contexts, Olaniyi and Aligwekwe (2013) see the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaties, the SALT II talks in 1972 as emphasis to arms control and disarmament in international politics and security.

However, none of the mentioned studies had linked the emergence of modern terrorism, its proliferation and assertive character to the seeming failure of the UN arm control neither did they evaluate state self-interest as a possible factor to the emergence of contemporary terrorism. This is the gap the present review seeks to fill.

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM.

A closer scrutiny of arm race, the UN arms control initiatives, international conflicts, and transnational terrorism would reveal a dialectical trajectory of an entrenched affinity to power by states and none state actors mixed with post-cold war flavours both in interstate relations, foreign policy and inter citizens trade relations. These flavours are predictive of a zero future hegemon in the international system capable of exercising absolute power to sanctions states behaviour or influence compliance of international treaties and agreement. In the absence of such a leviathan, states will keep pursuing power through the acquisition and stockpiling of deadly arsenal leading to socioeconomic contradictions on which terrorism is anchored.

For instance, North Korea refusal to scale down on missile test is premised not only on the logic of national security, but also on deterrence. North Korea's action also indicates that UN sanctions and arms control mechanism are inadequate to demand compliance from states. It has equally. negated nuclear pundits' postulation that poor states cannot develop effective and efficient nuclear deterrence. As such, deterrence, national security and self-development are hurdles the UN Arms control cannot easily surmount. In retrospection, this has raised fundamental questions on why North Korea choose to develop its nuclear deterrence programme despite the backwardness of its economy and series of sanctions imposed on her by the international community, Steve (2019) and (Zack, 2017). The view and some of the central arguments of this paper is that the objective of arms control which is to strengthen stability and security all over the world has not been met in view of widespread insecurity occasioned by assertive subnational groups in the international system. These subnational groups otherwise called terrorist groups have not only make mockery of the UN arms control apparatus, they have positioned themselves as forces to reckon with. While states pursue power and hegemonic status in the international system through armament and deterrence, terrorism can thus be said to be one of many unevaluated consequences of power relations within and between states, and since states are key actors in international system, the international system cannot be shielded from contradictions generated in state internal politics. As a consequence, researchers have increasingly discussed the notion of arms control and terrorism in the context of the UN Arms control mechanism from multiple viewpoints (Enders and Sandler, 2002; Hoffman 2002).

While extant literature in the field of conflict, terrorism, security and foreign policy studies have explored the causes and consequences of global terrorism, little has been done to correlate the failure of the UN arms control and the emergence of the assertive character of terror groupings. For example, Ellingson (2001) linked terrorism to the notion of the "Myth of the Noble Savage," indicating an increasingly illusory view at local and global levels of the real reasons behind terrorism. For instance, Sokolsky (2001), examined the renovation of the U.S. Strategic Arms Control Policy amidst its impacts on global security, Larsen and Rattray (1996), Olaniyi and Aligwekwe, (2013). (Rourke, 2009) try to extrapolate arms control and the UN by collocating Strategic Arm Limitation Talks SALT1&2 with Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan and the signing of the Intermediate Range Missile Treaty with the US. While Zack (2017) examined global security in the context of deterrence and armament of North Korea.

However, in evaluating the diverse hazards associated with extensive power seeking through armament and the growth of terrorist illegal networks, the mentioned researchers did not examine the effectiveness of the UN's arms control in the context of the proliferation of arms by terrorist groupings, neither did they connect the prolongation of terrorism in the international system to arms production, sales and diversion from states control by admixture and complicity of states and none states actors, this is the preoccupation of this review.

THE CONCEPT AND HISTORY OF ARMS CONTROL.

Arms are weapons responsible for inflicting injuries and used for war or any purpose intended to cause harm. From small arms to nuclear weapons to missiles and all sorts of arms; arms acquisition, production and usage have left half of the world's population in poverty and led many into destitution and hunger. Several reports reveal that bans on the production and sale of arms are not always adhered to in full by all governments. The world's resources are sunk into arms in the context of national security and deterrence that have destroyed several communities and nation- states. The world leaders at the UN millennium summit in 2000 pledged to cut poverty by half by 2015. The UN requested $50 billion per year to achieve the set goals. Most governments cried of not having the resources and pledged less than a quarter of this amount. It is astonishing, however, to note that despite the above stated inability to pay for development, governments have spent more than $10 trillion on armaments since 1990 (Rotfeld, 2001:34).

The control of arms has become a contentious issue. This is because those at the helm of affairs like Britain, America, France, Italy, Russia and China are listed among the world's top arms producing nations (Olaniyi and Aligwekwe, 2013). The central objective of arms control has been to strengthen stability and security in the world especially in the period that marked the end of the cold war. According to Koulik and Kokoski, (1994:24),' this period (1990—1992) was marked by series, of achievements in conventional arms control'. Although before this period (the early stage of the industrial age) transnational efforts have been made to control warfare and the weapons used to execute it. However, Arms control efforts began with the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) between the United States and the Soviet Union in the late 1960s and early 1970s which invariably led to the Anti- Ballistic Missile Treaty and an interim strategic arms limitation agreement in 1972. Accordingly, the SALT II talks started in 1972 leading to agreement in 1979. Due to the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan, the United States never ratified the treaty, however, the agreement was honoured by both sides. The Intermediate- Range Nuclear Forces Treaty was signed between the United States and Soviet Union in 1987 and ratified in 1988 which led to an agreement to destroy all missiles with ranges from 500 to 5,500 kilometres. The 1993 chemical weapons convention was signed banning the manufacture and use of chemical weapons. The Strategic Arms Reduction Talks Treaties were signed as START I and START II, by the United States and the Soviet Union to further restrict weapons. This was further reinforced by the treaty on strategic offensive reductions. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty was signed in 1996 banning all nuclear explosions in all environments, for military or civilian purposes.

In the words of Larsen and Rattray (1996:56), "The most significant arms control during the 1990s involved efforts to control nuclear arms." These efforts were seen in the START I and START II treaties and the NPT renewal and the CTBT. The Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START I) was signed in 1991 after a decade of negotiation by President George Bush of the U.S. and Mikhail Gorbachev of the USSR. As Rourke (2001) notes, the treaty mandated significant cut backs in U.S. and Soviet strategic nuclear forces, including a limit of 1,600 delivery vehicles and 6,000 strategic explosive nuclear devices each. The processes of reducing strategic range (over 5,500 kilometers) delivery system and warheads therefore began with START I. Rourke adds that "both the United States and Russia have used dynamite to destroy hundreds of ICBM silos, have cut up ICBMs, dismantled bombs and warheads, and have withdrawn nuclear weapons from numerous sites." These successes have seen that silos at several US ICBM sites are now completely empty, and some of the bases sold.

Further steps were taken in 1993 when President Boris Yetsin replaced Gorbachev at the helm of affairs in the Soviet and his US counterpart George Bush signed the START II treaty, reducing the heap of nuclear weapons. The senate rectified the treaty in 1997 in the US, but angered over the expansion of North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the air war against Yugoslavia and several other issues delayed Russian's parliament from ratifying the treaty until May 2000. The Russian's ratification was conditional, that in effect delays final agreement. Moscow threatened that unless Washington abandons the possibility of building the national missile defense system the agreement will not be signed. They also threatened that if US goes ahead with the missile defense system, then they will withdraw from the START I treaty (Olaniyi and Aligwekwe, 2013)

In 1997, Moscow had not ratified START II treaty, but President Bill Clinton and Boris Yeltsin agreed on the broad principles for a third round of START. This was aimed at further cutting the quantity of nuclear devices mounted on strategic range delivery system by one third of the START II treaty limits (Rourke, 2009). The goal was to further bring down the number of such weapons to between 2000 and 2500. Negotiation on this however was not possible unless Russia ratifies in totality the STAR II treaty (Olaniyi and Aligwekwe, 2013).

Additional efforts were seen in the establishment of the Biological and Chemical Arms Control and the Anti- Ballistic Missile Treaty to curtail biological and chemical weapons and the development of missiles capable of destroying targeted enemies respectively. To extensively appreciate the concept of arms control, it will serve better explicatory purpose if the concept of terrorism is explained.

THE CONCEPT AND HISTORY OF TERRORISM.

Terrorism is a multifaceted and complex phenomenon. Its central purpose has been described as devising method to induce fear to a target population with the use of force or eruptive mechanism to achieve its aim. It has been construed as the poor man's force and a weapon fail-safe to leave its perpetrators awash in the blood of innocents. It is an asymmetrical battle involving two unequal parties. The historical evolution of terrorism is clouded with inconsistency in date and time just as the definition of the concept is laddered with different explanations. For this paper, terrorism is Anglo-Saxon in origin and Eurocentric in geospatial. In its miniature form, terrorism has always been

in the nature of man. Although excuses for its extended activity has been given by liberal cum modernization theorists as atavism, it began in large scale by Alexander the Greek during his invasion of Egypt in 332BC. Terrorism changes forms according to the means of production, technology and the cognitive dissonance of its perpetrators. In Africa, it came as imperialism, existed as colonialism and as continued as globalization and neocolonialism. Depending on perpetrators discontent, terrorism can be an instrument of coercion or resistance. Central to all definition of the phenomenon is the use of arms, and strategic exploitation. Scholars like Dennis (1996), Bayer (2008), Dreyfuss (2006), and Micheal & Hassan (2015) devoted attention mainly on counter terrorism cum military intervention, and the labelling of terrorism as Arabcentric. Their studies lay mainly on ascertaining the extent to which terrorism has led to global insecurity without factoring in the negative and spiraling influence and implication of western capitalism through imperialism, colonialism, neocolonialism and globalization. These are structures which have supplied extensive fecundity to resource conflicts, political struggles, terrorism and general insecurity in the global south. Terrorism and arms proliferation are intricately interweaved, and have been aided by the failure of the UN arms control regimes to delimits myriads of actors in weapon business leading to the sustenance of terrorism in the international system

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This paper appropriated state-centric realism theory by Kenneth waltz (1979) as an alternative to the failure of idealism to curtail problems posited by states pursuance of security via armament or deterrence. The theory posited that the highest goal for a state is its survival which explains why its actions are driven by security responsibility rather than moral principles. The theory sees the impediments to UN arms control and the challenges of terrorism on international peace and security to be consequences of state pursuits of hegemonic status in the contexts of power and self-interest. Other proponents of the theory are Karpowicz (2011), and Galston, (2010). Scholars use this theory to explain the nexus between skepticism regarding the relevance of the promulgation of ethical norms and the politics of their implementation in the international system. As a consequence, realist scholars argued that international politics outweighs the relevance of international law since the international system is characterized by zero justice and the active potentiality of conflict amongst states. The realists' perspective underscore the precedence of national security over collective security in view of the complexity and multidimensionality of arms control regimes and the emergence of terrorism.

In the light of the above, realism is predisposed to the supposition that collective security, cultural, traditional, trade and investment, military alliance and ideology is to be balanced against a general commitment to world peace. In fact, realists are of the opinion that ratification and verification of treaties in the UN arms regimes are not only at the prerogative of the state, they are constrained in the contexts of the selfish and competitive nature of the international system which is a morass to the success of the implementation of ethical norms of the UN and collective security leading to consequences of conflicts including terrorism. The trajectory of the current assessment regarding the weaknesses of the UN arms control which has eventuated terrorism is in synch with the assumptions of the realist scholars regarding the predatory nature of humans and the state. Umoh (2021) is of the opinion that the dynamics of power and potentiality of conflict amongst states in the international system is characterized by a plethora of interactions, values and interests that are sometimes interconnected, yet defined by myriads of occasions valued and formed by some entwined power relations that is mutually exclusive. This presupposes that the exercise of power in the international system is first and foremost, state-centric.

The relevance of the theory to the arguments of the paper is its ability to explicate the nexus between power relations amongst states, the weaknesses of the UN arm controls regimes and the implications on global security occasioned by terrorism. In support to the above, specifically on the potentiality of arms proliferation leading to support of bellicism and terroristic activities of sub-national groups, karpowicz (2011) drawing the fecundity of his analysis from the leviathan proposal of Thomas Hobbs, argued that man is subject to perpetual and restless desires for power. That independence states just like man, are selfish and enemies by nature with zero individual hegemon strong enough to regulate their quest for hegemonic status. In view of this, the paper argues that arms control regimes are sometimes procured out of the need to preserve the human race and not necessarily born out of adherence to the UN norms. It furthers argues. while drawing oxygen from the realists' proposals, that arms control regimes lack extensive coverage to influence weapon manufacture, sales and use by states and clandestine agents even as regimes ratification and verification are at the mercy of implementation in the context of states selfish power seeking. And points to the US, Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Israeli and Egypt as terror enabler states.

The Politics of Arms Control and Terrorism in the Contemporary International System.

A major challenge to the socioeconomic and political stability of the international system in general has been the unprecedented rise in terrorism occasioned by arms proliferation. The savagery, regularity, precision, sophistication, and gusto that characterizes terrorists' operational patterns is reinforced by sophisticated weaponry. This has brought into question the much acclaimed influence of the UN on arms control. Terrorism too, with its precipitated and unparalleled destruction of lives and property through unconventional warfare methods has equally and consistently embarrassed the UN arms control grimes. Traditionally, Arms control suggests the presence of norms and the need to reduce and control the use of arms. Schmid (2011) notes that arms control are efforts, through international agreements, to limit or reduce war making capabilities by restricting the quantity and or quality of weapons and marking the forces or the zone of their deployment in an attempt to avoid arms races or conflict escalation. But war in the form of terrorism, piracy, banditry, clandestine conflicts and resource crisis owe their fecundity to the prevalence of arms.

In its various forms, arms have accentuated the operational capabilities of terrorist groupings leading to more humanitarian emergencies than anything else, it creates enemies, violence and insecurity. This is because its presence gives rise to war and terrorism by both state and subnational groups. On the one hand, arms control at the state level ought to commence at the point of manufacture to ensure their nonexistence before demonstration, sales, exportation or importation. But the international structuring of states based on the principles of bipolarized alliance torpedoed arms control regimes. This has led to a change in the nature of arms control and disarmament in the post-cold war international system different from the period of the cold war which witnessed arms control and disarmament as the highest priority of the bipolar powers in maintaining a balance. On the other hand, and due to new none state actors, arms control ought to begin at the level of arms demonstration and weapon test. but since some aspects of weapon production in some countries is private business, especially in the industrialized nations like US, Russia, Britain, the implementation of arms control agreements seems to be felt at the last level of control – exportation. Recall that no country is hegemonic enough to exert strict influence in arms manufacturing, sales or use and since private manufacturers must make profit, the UN arms control has been faced with myriads of challenges from state's actors and clandestine agents. Arms manufacturers in western countries have been accused to have induce conflicts, especially in post-colonial states. These conflicts to them are means of production, and have metastasized into a factor of production to sustained capitalism. As a major factor to arms control, the activities of post-colonial states regarding sovereign security and the changes in the trajectory of conflicts can best be evaluated in the context of transnational terrorism and repressive governance in the Middle East and Africa.

Before the contemporary weakened alliance and multi-polarity, the security of the international system was based on strict bipolarity and deterrence which posed a great threat to human existence. In this contexts Rotfeld (2001) is of the opinion that arms control was considered to be a pillar that supported strategic stability to maintained the balance of power between the superpowers and their respective allies. The predominant goals of traditional arms control, as developed in the late 1950s and early 1960s was to enhance security, through power and interest sharing amongst the two major powers in order to avoid global nuclear annihilation. This was to be achieved through the surrendering of some of the powers and military capabilities of the then two powers in order to repair their deep ideological and political chasm and engaged in dialogues at the end of the cold war. However, arms control experienced a fundamental change with the arrival of new actors. States like Pakistan, India and North Korea have moved the challenges faced by the UN arms control along a continuum from excellence to poor. This is not helped by arms proliferation by manufacturers and clandestine agents. Capitalist states play a decisive role in arms proliferation since the manufacture, sales and innovation of arms are linked to them.

A brief taxonomy of arms control types and strategic application.

Restriction Type	Restriction Process	Example
Horizontal Restriction	Restricting the proliferation of some weapon types to the existing group of states who have such technology	NPT 1968
Numerical Restrictions	Usually bilaterally, this involves overall caps on weapons, usually by type	START I 1991 – 1992
Technology Restriction	Bilaterally, this usually involves mutual and agreement to forgo a technology deemed to threaten balance-of-power. Multilaterally, this usually stipulates a blanket ban on weapons of a certain type	SALT I 1972 Biological Weapons Convention 1972
Confidence Building Measures	These usually surround transparency, sharing knowledge about escalation/procedures, and (crucially), establishing communication/verification/compliance.	Usually informal and often implicit transmission of information.
Geographic Restrictions	Agreements surrounding the placement, but perhaps also targeting, of weapon systems.	Usually informal, often executive-led agreement.

Source authors adaptation from Griffiths, O'Callaghan and Roach (2007)

In addition to the various arguments of this paper is the position that arms control can best be evaluated in the contexts of existing cold and post-cold war traditionalism which runs along a continuum of historical, political, and normative assessment of arms policies. In view of this, the concept of arms control should be reviewed to scale the fence of differences between conceiving arms control as a means to achieve a larger goal and seeing arms control as an end unto itself. This is in response to the proliferation of terrorist groupings whose action sometimes depends on actors' manipulation of ideology and supply of arms. Granted, arms control process in certain categories of armaments have reduce the chance of interstate war, but then, it has equally increased the access to other categories of weapons by terrorist groups.

Process of Arms control and the birth of terrorism in the contemporary international system

This process began in 1982 with the strategic arms negotiations between the cold war superpowers and gained traction in 1991 when the USA and USSR signed the START treaty. The usefulness of the START treaty over any predecessor was in the expected significance reductions - particularly in the Soviet arsenal. Baglione, (1997) noted that the super powers made very little progress on arms control, including START and the Intermediate Nuclear Force (INF) talks throughout the first half of the 1980s. but agreed in 1985 to resume dialogue in three related forums to discuss strategies as well as space and intermediate-range systems.

The resumption of engagements between the two hegemons in 1986 at Reykjavik, established the basic outline for the START treaty limiting the number of strategic warheads to 6000 and restricting the number of nuclear lunch vehicles to 1600 and to abolish all ballistic missiles in ten years. Baglione (1997) argued that the START process suffered setbacks when the USA insisted on pursing strategic defense while the Soviets disagreed to reductions in offence systems. The two issues, offence and defense stalled the negotiation till September 1989 when the Soviets agreed to some reduction leading to the foreign ministers of the two states reinvigorating the START process with the instructions to reach an agreement.

For Baglione (ibid) the cement for this agreement was secured from an accord in 1991 between Washington and kremlin to make significant cutbacks in their strategic arsenals. As signs of good faith in the coming months after the accord was signed, the superpowers also unilaterally began to undertake steps to emasculate their readiness for war, eliminate tactical nuclear weapons, and accelerate the START reductions. These outcomes led many political analysts to attribute the success to the collapse of Soviet Union and attendant domestic political developments. However, closer examination suggests the improbability of a singular focus on power from both states or internal political contradictions to explain adequately these instances of arms control. Rather, the political will of the leaders in Washington and kremlin is to be thanked for its principal role in balancing domestic political considerations against international priorities simultaneously.

Although a mirror image of the above achievement would show a nine years struggle since the negotiations began before the two superpowers reached an agreement to make significant reductions in their strategic arsenals. Yet the action of the superpowers towards the process was not devoid of their domestic political interests. An interpretation of the words of Baglione (1997) would mean that arms control is a battle between liberal and conservative forces in the USA and a struggle between reformists and orthodox members of the elite in the USSR that often results to the winner taking it all. In a case where neither is dominant, the domestic actors, often sponsored by arms manufacturing companies, who were hitherto involved in policy formulation will try to cut deals to arrive at a negotiating position that serves their organizational interests instead of national security. When this occurs, the pruning, framing and execution of both domestic and foreign policies becomes subjected to cognitive dissonance- a situation where groups interest is substituted for national interests and disorder will ensue. Recall that terrorism emanate from disorder and injustice within the state, and the cold war superpowers transported the disorder in their respective domains to the international scene, first by US propping of Islamic fundamentalist groups under the Taliban to stall the Russian spread of socialism in Afghanistan. This was the birth of contemporary terrorism in the international system. In contextualizing international terrorism, three key elements were defined by Schmid and Jongman (1988); (1) the use (or threat) of violence, (2) political goals, and (3) the aim to sow fear as a means of achieving these political goals in a target population. This description regards state terrorism as the coercive assaults on people by the state (Piazza, 2009; Nairn & James, 2005). Terrorism could thus emanate from actors, persons, organisations, entities or organisations of the state and non-state with access to arms. Actors like the US, France, Britain and Israel are not only culpable, their actions and others have constantly impeded several UN resolutions on arms control

ARMS CONTROL, TERRORISM AND GLOBAL SECURITY

On normative and ontological views, arms control ought to be supranational with attention paid to the factors which could generate entropy in the society leading to the formation of subnational groupings. Factors such as poverty, corruption, governance morass, skewed political culture, faux democracy and weak economic substructure in states are complex, yet proximal to socioeconomic contradictions generated by the consequences of capitalism. Although terrorism maybe assumed to be militant socialism to emasculate the spread of capitalism, the politicization of the "success narratives' of terrorism is misleading. References to ethnoreligious and cultural mixture as dominant strands of the argument have been documented in several writings critical of ethnoreligious underpinnings of terrorist sects (Onuoha, 2010; Waldek and Jayasekara,201). The dominant argument is that terrorist sects are instruments of forceful Islamization by Jihadists in a system of sovereign states with the capability to build and maintain sizable armed forces. And that since sovereignty cannot be shared, the expected Islamic state or caliphates will inherit the predatory disposition of its predecessor- the capitalist state. Arms control therefore is important to global security since states cannot ensure that rival states will not attempt to achieve hegemony by pursuing military superiority. In global security, trust often does not exist leading to states interpreting incoming information about assertive subnational groups or the military capabilities of rival states as threats.

The US and Russia were and are still very well placed in this situation. Evidence of a new military programme or spending by one state requires other states to respond on time to prevent the other side from achieving superiority thereby channeling development resources to arms and creating security dilemma. This security dilemma has resulted to arms race, state-centric terrorism and global insecurity. It is directly increasing political tension among states, raising

the probability and severity of crises, and the possibility of war. The main aim of arms control should therefore be to strategically address the negative effects of such security dilemma and ensure that states or private arms manufacturers do not encourage terrorism by sales of arms

According to Larsen (2002:3), arms control and its importance for international security cannot be glossed over. He buttressed this assertion with three basic significant roles that arms control has played in global security especially during and post-cold war era. The present assessment contextualized these roles as follows;

1. *Reduction in the risk of War*: In view of setting limits on and restraining strategic arms race behavior, early arms control theorists sees Arms control as a prime means restraining certain types of technology that is in practical terms synonymous with reducing the risk of war. The underlying premise was that war could most likely to begin with a surprise nuclear attack made possible by unrestrained competition in ballistic missile weapon technology. Therefore, those weapon systems employing technologies that in theory, may contribute to the ability to execute a surprise nuclear attack against the nuclear retaliatory forces of the other side, or that can undermine the ability of either side to hold deterrent targets at risk, became principal candidates for arms limitation agreements.

2. *Reduction in the cost of preparing for War*: Arms control theorists believed that controls checkmate economic resources otherwise squandered on military spending since a link between arms races and economic ruins do not require rocket science IQ for evaluation. They further embrace the idea that disarmament would make possible the diversion of resources toward worthier objectives. The logic is occasioned by the possibility of arms control to provide the same degree of security at lower levels of weapons and its ability to technically present fewer weapons and thus lower overall defense spending. Therefore, arms and the nexus between arms reduction and development will be underscored by mutual reduction in certain types of technology that could lead to fewer costs in defense research and development. As result, weapons production, force deployment, operations, and maintenance will lead to financial savings for domestic economic priorities to promote internal prosperity.

3. *Reduction in the damage caused by war:* in case of war occurring, the fielding of fewer weapons as a result of arms limitation agreements, would conversely eventuate less damage. Damage also could be limited by developing certain types of active defense strategies and technologies, such as ballistic missile defenses.

In the light of zero assurances from states not to wage war, the above expectations appear to be idealistic. This is because states do not premise their security at the mercy of another state. Conversely, it becomes difficult for actors to implement to the later, all clauses in arms agreements. Although arms control has witnessed the downgrading of weapons of mass destruction and imposed limitations on interstate wars, arms manufacturing can be blamed for creating and sustaining conflicts and terrorism in the post-cold war era.

UNITED NATIONS ARMS CONTROL AND TERRORISM IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA.

Interrogating arms control and terrorism dynamics in the post-cold war era will reveal a cascading relationship between the weaknesses of arms control agreements, none implementation or implementation by half and proliferation of terrorism. This relationship provides a useful entry point to understand recent and ongoing dynamics of global security in view of weapon manufacturing and sales. Terrorist profile shows 65 known terrorist groups. Their assertiveness and gusto have increased since 9/11 and specifically, since the successes of ISIS. ISIS successes can be linked in part at least, to the sophistry of weaponry and InfoTech. As such, terrorism by subnational groups becomes widespread due to the emergence of state terrorism that is reinforced by the weaknesses of arms control agreements in the post-cold war era. The UN involvement in arms control is a security imperative that is constantly hoped to lead to the vehement and vigorous pursue of disarmament to achieve world peace. However, arms accumulation and sophistication have absorbed scarce resources to the detriment of economic and social development in many countries. The result has been the prolongation and sustenance of conflicts and terrorism.

The impact of the misuse and illicit circulation of different types of arms is felt in the rate at which terrorism has been protracted. This has continued to be of considerable concern to the United Nations and to the broader international community. The weakness of the UN arms control mechanism to regulate small arms and weapons trafficking by state and none state actors are key enablers and sustainers of armed conflict and terrorism. In addition, the easy availability and lack of adequate control systems of light arms and weapons is facilitating a vast spectrum of terrorism from states and subnational groupings. This has added to human rights violations, aggravated poverty and impeded sustainable development. According to the United Nations' Security Council (2017), the excessive accumulation and widespread availability of these weapons have increased the lethality and duration of violence. As a corollary, the international small arms trade in 2014 is estimated to have worth at least $6 billion with ammunition accounting for 38 per cent of all global transfers. Thus, a discussion of global or international terrorism often reinforces the implicit contributions made by the ineffectiveness of arms control against collaborators. Terrorism collaborators are supported by the consequences of globalization matrix. About this, Cronin (2004) has attempted to link international terrorism to globalization. That is to say, that the complicity and contradictions of arms control and globalization are key factors fueling global terrorism

To this end, a significant portion of direct terroristic deaths are attributable to the use of small arms, and nearly half of all violent deaths between 2010 and 2015 were caused by 'shadow terrorists' with easy access to arms. debates on "shadow terrorism," presupposes that terrorism is shrouded in secrecy through targeted attacks (Ware, 2013, p.

20). The intense controversy regarding the issues of arms control and global terrorism points to the various perspectives and viewpoints on both concepts. For instance, Barsamian (2001) argued that the "the United States is a leading terrorist state", as they are directly or indirectly involved in several trans-border attacks and sales of weapons to terrorist groups. As a consequence, the threat posed by the proliferation of weapons and their means of delivery due to the weaknesses of arms control has evolved significantly leading to state and non-state actors use of chemical weapons. Paradoxically, arms control regimes have witnessed nuclear and radioactive material being stolen and sold on the black market.

RESPONSES FROM ARMS MANAGEMENT IN PEACE OPERATIONS AND TERRORISM-INFECTED SETTINGS

Disarmament of rogue state. In addressing conflict-affected situations or in the deployment of military intervention in terrorists red zones it has become imperative for the UN arms control agencies to be circumspect in weapons and ammunition management especially in critical peacekeeping operations and in the activities of the Security Council. The issue of disarming states with developing economy while states who manufacture all kinds of weapon are allowed to sale arms including in the black market is part of the lopsided implementation of control which has led some states like China and north Korea to flaunt the UN arms control systems in their farvour .For example, in the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Mali, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration components established weapon registration and marking systems to ensure the traceability of all weapons and ammunition collected during the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process. But several weapons in the Middle East are sold by the US and European states to the highest bidder, not minding terrorists accessing those weapons

In view of this, adequate management of contingent and civilian-controlled materiel, both arms and ammunition, is of utmost importance to ensure that these weapons are not lost, including through theft, seizure or diversion. In addition, the need for a paradigm shift in approaches to peacekeeping and military intervention is paramount in the light of the complex linkages between transnational illicit trafficking in weapons and the resilience of terrorist-affected and post-terroristic States.

Demilitarization of conflict zones. Transnational weapon trafficking is often made easier in conflict zones. Actors including mercenaries and clandestine organizations becomes channels for gun running. To manage the inflow and out flow of arms, demilitarization of areas affected by conflicts become parts of the mechanisms to dissuade weapons getting to subnational groups. In its resolution 2287 of 2016 regarding *missions in Afghanistan, Côte d'Ivoire, Darfur and Haiti,* the Security Council of the United Nations acknowledged the role of poor arms and ammunition management in fueling conflict, instability and terrorism.

Arms Embargo Monitoring and Compliance. The synergy between host government and the United Nations agencies is to address weapons and ammunition management in conflict-affected settings to stifle the potentiality of weapons facilitating the formation of terror groups. This is implemented especially in areas such as stockpile management and physical security, marking, tracing, record-keeping and the creation of awareness on the impact of small arms and light weapons acting as catalysts to terrorism. In paragraph 28 of its resolution 2220 (2015), the Security Council requested the Secretary-General to examine and present best practices and arrangements that could be used by the United Nations peacekeeping operations and other relevant Council-mandated entities to guide the implementation of their mandated tasks on compliance and monitoring of arms embargoes in order to provide assistance and expertise to host States, and sanctions to defaulting committees and expert groups. Consequently, it has become mandatory on field missions to support United Nations arms embargoes even with skewed arrangements to implement their mandate to monitor the Council- mandated arms embargoes and compliance. For example, an Integrated Embargo Monitoring Unit established within the United Nations Operation, is to ensure the continuous monitoring of the flows of arms and ammunition, centralized systematic data collection and on-site analysis, established country- specific arms and ammunition profiles and other tools to advanced arms embargo monitoring (United Nations Security Council Report, 2017). While the structural arrangements for missions to fulfill arms embargo related mandates may help checkmate weapons disappearance, the question of consistency across field missions in undertaking arms embargo-related tasks is often constrained by actors' interest ranging from arms manufacturers, arms brokers, middlemen and arms dealers who may contract with national security forces within the mission's jurisdiction. In this connection, the structure of field missions to undertake arms embargo monitoring and compliance tasks is weak to resist the influence of powerful states like the US, who relies on conflicts to sale arms particularly in the context of the 'responsibility to protect'

Weaknesses in Roles Played by the United Nations in Arms Control

In relation to disarmament and control, the United Nations plays three linked but analytically distinct roles. According to Lewis and Thakur (2004:4-5) these roles are: (i) As a funnel for processing ideas into norms and policies and for transmitting information from national sources to the international community;(ii) As a forum for discussion and negotiation of common international positions, policies, conventions and regimes; and (iii) As a font of international legitimacy for the authoritative promulgation of international norms, appeals for adherence to global norms and regimes, and coercive measures to enforce compliance with them. However, borrowing Lewis and Thakur conceptualization of these roles, this paper contextualizes the roles of UN arms control in the context of its weakness as follows:

1. *As a mare funnel*: Due to the fact that key treaties and regimes secured in conferences on disarmament — not just bilateral treaties signed by the Soviet Union and the United States during the Cold War on intermediate range and strategic forces, but on multilateral regimes like the Non-Proliferation Treaty,, Chemical Weapon Convention, Biological and Toxin Weapon Convention and the various regional Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones were all negotiated outside the UN framework, it could thus be argued that the United Nations has not been

the chief architect of arms control and disarmament. Although the ideas behind many of the existing regimes were often first funneled through the UN system, much of the idea for a total cessation of nuclear testing were conceived or sponsored by independent states like India at the General Assembly in December 1954 or the US in January 1957 when she proposed a five-point plan to the General Assembly to end the production of nuclear weapons and testing.

As further evidence to the above, Fiji, New Zealand and Papua New Guinea under joint sponsorship, presented the proposal of negotiating a South Pacific Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones (NWFZ) to the General Assembly for endorsement in 1975. Similarly, the Rarotonga Treaty (1985) linked to the regional verification system for the South Pacific to the global IAEA inspections regime within the UN system shows that regimes formed outside the UN could influence the direction of arms embargo and indeed monitory and the politics of compliance. Example, The New Agenda Coalition *the NAC countries* (Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa and Sweden), a group which cuts across traditional regional groupings whose objective and basic policy positions are agreed outside the UN influence has only used the United Nations essentially as a funnel to advance their agendas of non-proliferation and disarmament.

2. ***The United Nations as a forum for ranting***: Although the United Nations is the chief expositor of international norms and moral code as embodied in its Charter, the General Assembly resolutions are the most adhered to by weaker states. As a matter of fact, the UN security council refusal to increase its membership and devolve it veto to the general assembly is an indication that the UN is a forum for ranting by disgruntled weak nations. The global southern states compliance with internationally prescribed behavior to reconcile divergent interests is a consequence of lack of real power and the fear of sanctions in the international system, whereas, states with nukes and other deterring capacity can behave as they like under the umbrella of states interest and national security. The US for instance has invaded or involved in military campaign against over 191 countries of 193 a staggering 98% of all countries with zero sanction by the UN. Conversely, the UN can be said to be a conspiracy that gives legitimacy to various degree of terrorism depending on which country is behind the conflict. The General Assembly is like most democracy in the developing economies, a placebo to make the exploited and sick citizens feel wanted and important. But in reality, it is an arena where contested norms only by weak countries can be debated and reconciled.

3. ***As a town crier***: The UN only *town cries* calling on its moral authority to ensure compliance with global norms whenever any of the big5 is involved especially when behavior is considered to be unacceptable yet not in fact proscribed by any treaty to which any of the big 5 or an emergence muscle like North Korea, India or Pakistan may be party. In May 1998, India and Pakistan conducted nuclear tests. In doing so, they broke no treaty commitments, for neither had signed the None Proliferation Treaty. But they violated the global anti-nuclear norm, and were merely criticized. In that particular scenario, the landscape for sanctions attracted a mirage in the Security Council, for the simple reason that the big5 as usual were caught in a particularly vicious conflict of interest with regard to nuclear nonproliferation even as they are also the NPT-defined NWS.

The big5, who preach non-proliferation but practice deterrence, have diminished the moral authority of both the UN and the Security Council to oppose proliferation. In these circumstances, the Security Council's condemnation of the 1998 Indian and Pakistani tests—when not one of the over 2,000 previous tests had ever been so condemned by the Council—inflamed opinion that the UN is a toothless bulldog, a mare town crier capable of flexing her muscles when poor countries are involved. As a fallout, the Security Council Resolution 1172 of 6 June 1998 found itself in hypocritical situation condemning India's and Pakistan's tests and demanding that they stop. The request, just like the ones for North Korea, was dismissed by Indian spokesmen as 'coercive and unhelpful in respect of the objectives it seeks to address.

POLITICAL HURDLES IN UNITED NATIONS ARMS CONTROL.

The political hurdles to the UN arms control regimes are tangent to actors' realpolitik in the organization. Actors whose financial muscle are felt in monetary support and technical backing have been manipulating the arms control regimes leading critical analysts to suggest that the UN arms control has never been hindered by pure necessity. From dependency theorist perspective, the political economy of Arms control activities is a focus that interest the big5. Their interests are subsumed in the economic interactions between them and states who have been structured to depend on industrialized capitalist countries for survival. Yet, the progress of arms control has not only been minuscule, its weaknesses have fecund bellicism and support terrorism as part of its unintended consequences. Several issues including states interests stand on the way to its success. For Olaniyi and Aligwekwe, (2013), these are political hurdles or factors impeding arms control efforts that are not impossible to surmount. However, it follows that these hurdles are responsible for its weaknesses to which this paper summarizes as follows.

1. *Disparity in compliance to Treaty Commitments*: the disparities in compliance occasioned by deliberate misunderstanding of the requirements for treaty compliance breeds "systemic non-compliance". Some states often pretend to be unaware that the pursuance of deterrence safeguard national interest more while at the same time, emasculate ratifying or acceding to a treaty. This usually results to deliberate non-compliance like in the case of the DPRK, Iran, Iraq, and Libya to NPT. Systemic noncompliance is premised on lack of commitment on the part of the nuclear-weapon states to fulfilled their NPT disarmament.

2. *Systemic noncompliance*. In the UN arms control systems, lack of commitment on the part of the big5 to disarmament agreements presupposes moral deficit to pursue or enforce compliance from states seeking

nuclear power. As a result, arranging multilateral responses to systemic violations becomes not only difficult, but unattainable especially when the Security Council deliberately allow itself to be deceived or misled (as was the case with Iraq).

3. *Strong interstate diplomatic ties*: States with long history of diplomatic ties do no report their friends whether they are of the nuclear power states or the nuclear power seeking states. This is done no out of fear, but loyalty and for expected future support in security or diplomatic goals.

4. *Secrecy and data loss:* States often classified highly sensitive information and data regarding military innovation at the early stage leading to loss of information and data. Some data may deliberately be made nebulous or disappeared, especially historic data on past production of fissile nuclear material. In this wise, even the most basic statistic about the number nuclear weapons officially existing in the world remains unknown to the public, and in many instances other data on conventional weapons and military expenditures are routed to *voice mail*-made not to exist or remain highly classified.

5. *National security context*: Due to the secrecy surrounding the production of nukes, some states engage in espionage to obtain information and data leading to suspicion and more layers of security. Conversely, treaties become very difficult for verification. Again, power seeking countries do not often willingly allow for verification sighting national security issues. As result, implementing intrusive inspections via physical enumeration, rigorous accounting methods for payment of verification, creating new verification capabilities with respect to biological weapons, missiles, space weapons, and nuclear disarmament while not compromising commercial or legitimate defense secrets are the most difficult political hurdles to overcome in arms control.

6. *Internal political scheming.* Democratic states find it difficult to ratify arms control agreements or verify compliance due to myriads of domestic political actors' interest. This is not helped by the complex decision making processes occasioned sometimes by the differences in political ideology. Some domestic political actors are idealists, seeking for peace and are treaty compliant, while others are realists who are predispose to deterrence and thus noncompliant, making arms control or disarmament herculean.

7. *Absence of a hegemon to seek irreversibility*: The anarchic international system with zero hegemon with the capacity to protect every state and enforce compliance presupposes self-help. Incidentally, self-help premised on national interest and security makes no room for irreversibility of treaty or compliance no-withdrawal. For instance, the DPRK withdrawal from the NPT citing national security could not be resisted due to the presence of zero hegemon or enforcer leading many states to propose new procedures for exercising withdrawal rights. Efforts in the context of the NPT and other multilateral forums to promote nuclear disarmament have stressed the importance of measures to ensure that fissile materials will not be recycled into new weapons. But these are hardly enforced

8. *Arms manufactures interest and clandestine agents*: Arms sales by states or clandestine agents either as a result of shift in alliance or profit focus. makes it difficult to determined which actor will not pursue interest leading to terrorism. Arms control and the emergence of contemporary terrorism is a contradiction in terms. Coping with terrorists and other non-state actors and extending controls to arms manufacturers in items of design information, expert advice, technical data to developing new initiatives against black marketers and illicit brokers are all challenges facing the United Nations arms control.

THE POLITICS OF THE UNITED NATIONS ARMS CONTROL

As earlier enumerated in the hurdles facing arms control, the UN seems to be making inroads in countries with little or no assertiveness in the international system. Developing economies are particularly constrained by factors ranging from the politics of foreign aids, Responsibility to Protect (R2P) or strong alliance. Incidentally, these countries are sometimes classified as rogue states even with zero expansionist focus against other countries. Others are deemed conflict settings and it is in such territories that the UN would flex its arms control muscle to the later. The politics is subsumed in threats of sanctions and excused on efforts of global counter insurgency.

United Nations' Security Council Report (2016) gave some examples of United Nations support for national arms and ammunition management efforts as provided in the table below. These are in addition to the long-standing, critical support provided by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Political Affairs to United Nations missions, including through disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes, actions and activities

Country	Decision/Action
Central African Republic	The Security Council decided that the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic would support the Central African Republic authorities in developing and operationalizing a national commission for small arms and light weapons to address civilian disarmament and illicit proliferation (resolution 2301 (2016), para. 34 (c) (iv)).

Haiti	The Security Council requested the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti to continue to support the Haitian authorities in the control of small arms, the development of a weapons registry and the revision of current laws on the importation and possession of arms (resolution 2313 (2016), para. 34).
Libya	The United Nations Support Mission in Libya has assisted national authorities, at their request, in establishing a national arms and ammunition management committee to improve coordination and decision-making between different ministries and agencies, as well as to ensure the consistent application of standards across government agencies, adequate resource mobilization and the development of an overarching national arms and ammunitions control framework and strategy
Mali	The Security Council authorized the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali to assist Malian authorities with the removal and destruction of mines and other explosive devices and with weapons and ammunition management (resolution 2295 (2016), para 20 (b)

Source: author's adaptation from Security Council Report (2016)

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The most difficult challenges facing arms control is the politics of compliance and the profiteering focus of both the big5 and private arm manufacturers. These challenges have given oxygen to the proliferation of light weapons in the dark markets leading to expansion of terrorism. The reduction in terror groupings can only be achieved if the arms control regimes are expanded or modified to include the least fire arm and ammunitions. To further sustain this, the UN needs to appropriate manufacturers license under its supervision and superintend sales and purchase of all weapons in the open market. On heavy weapons or WMD, the need to revitalize the process of global nuclear disarmament and the development of new global norms for missiles and missile defense, cannot be said to be over stressed. Although the reduction and elimination of the deadliest of arms will by no means guarantee an end to political armed conflict or terrorism, with this in mind, it will, but surely emasculate the fertile landscape to which terrorism seems to fester. If nation state like Israel would have conscience and free Palestine via the UN agreed two state system so that Islamic deep dislike towards the Jewish state will reduce together with the prospect for terrorism. That could offer positive prospects in reducing the scope and effects of conflicts and bellicism, while at the same time reducing the possibility of recurrence, and freeing enormous public resources for more productive economic and social uses, as Article 26 of the UN Charter envisages.

When the above is achieved, prospects for arms control and the reduction in terror groupings would be made the target of sustained political activity by networks and coalitions of diverse groups in the international system. If the contrary should be the case, the prospects would be grimmest when the most fundamental decisions about what weapons to develop, how much to spend, and which treaties to honor, are left to an elite group that are submerged in cognitive dissonance and immune to public accountability. States choice for increased security must be circumspective, especially of unintended consequences like terrorism while keeping collective security in mind.

Granted, the quest for states in the international system especially the super powers to retain hegemonic status, has created not only loophole for armament and weapon proliferations, it has equally created a leeway for terroristic activities of subnational groupings whose assertive character is supported by the weaknesses of the UN arms control. Conditioned violence therefore is consequent upon noncompliance to treaties and the politics of the big5. Conversely, the damages caused by arms are far inestimable especially in the continued expansion into new territories by terrorist groups. This is not helped by the violent expression of discontent by citizens of states. Arms control regimes are mechanisms to curtails the expansion of production, stockpiling and sale of weapons of all times and if adhered to would help reduce the prospects of conflict, war and terrorism.

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