



THE ISLAM, DEMOCRACY, AND SECULARISM: A CRITICAL COMPARATIVE OBSERVATION

Shah Mohammad Omer Faruqe Jubaer¹

Sheikh Maulana Shah Saleh Ahmed²

Shariful Haque Sadi³

Md Arif Ahmed Shablu⁴

Article history:	Abstract:
<p>Received: April 6th 2021 Accepted: April 22th 2021 Published: May 18^h 2021</p>	<p>This research paper dissects the hypothetical connection between religion and the democratic system, explicitly and impliedly Islam's relationship with liberal popular government. This research paper aims to examine the connection between Islam, Muslim majority social orders, and liberal democracy such that will progress hypothesis and work on concerning their relations. Even though this relationship is the prompt focal point of this research, the finishes of this research have a lot more extensive pertinence in enlightening the hypothetical relationship between religion, secularism, and majority rule government all in all, and in adding to the improvement of a liberal-vote based hypothesis for Muslim social orders specifically. The main research issue of this paper is that liberal democracy requires the shape of political secularism, however within the Muslim world nowadays the essential mental, political, and social assets at the transfer of Muslim democrats are religious. Implanted in this issue is the relationship between political culture and democracy. In seeking after this kind of ponder, there's a threat of assuming that the variable of political culture is being hoisted as the foremost notable calculate in clarifying the nonattendance of democracy within the Muslim world.</p>

Keywords: Democracy, Secularism, Islam, Liberal Democracy, political Modernization, Political democracy

INTRODUCTION:

The immediate objective of democracy is to track down the best arrangement for the issue of rule, by making or obliging the rulers to submit to the will of the controlled, through associations and foundations openly chose by all developed individuals from the country (Hashemi, N. 2009). If the majority rule government somehow happened to acknowledge just this point, even as a base, we would have affected an upset in (Muslim majority based countries) circumstances over a significant period, and in each viewpoint. The state in the Arab country, in the past and as of now, denies the 'accomplice' any part in government, while the actual quintessence of majority rule government is 'association' (al-shirk) in the issues of government. The standard of the special oneness of God is the foundation in our faith, and this is the thing that we should safeguard. Yet, we should at something very similar time accept that everything after God is diverse and should be based on the majority. First in this regard is human governance which ought to be liberated from the rule of unity (Islam, M. N., & Islam, M. S. 2018). Since we, Muslim regulatory states furthermore, Muslims, don't acknowledge an organization in government and politics any more than in the field of god and holiness, we can't determine any significance from democracy, nor any reasonable applied and social measurements from its content (Mahmood, S. (2006).

The democratic system, at that point, should target changing the mentality of the Islamic individual, all together for that individual to get tolerating of democratic practice as a genuine practice. Democracy is additionally important to change (Middle East) society, in change-arranged this time not from unity to majority and organization (al-shirk), as on account of its outlook, however from majority to solidarity. Oneness is presently prevailing in the Middle East political scene, while plurality, nay 'fracture', is predominant on the social level. By majority, here, I don't allude just to the various commonplace elements, yet in addition to the various organizations, minorities, and ethnic gatherings inside a similar element (Kuru, A. T., & Stepan, A. (Eds.). 2012). The democratic system, with its accentuation on the freedom of thought and articulation, furthermore, the majority of gatherings, is the system reasonable to cause this majority to acknowledge itself positively. The simple option in contrast to sectarianism also, tribalism is the plurality of gatherings, which is an essential part of democratic life. Gatherings, when their reality is engaged and when their associations are set up on clear philosophical decisions, educated by class interests without which a gathering doesn't merit the name which can effectively enter the acquired natural social systems and activate the class inconsistencies inside them and cut off their adequacy and authority. This would make ready for social attachment and mixture yet in addition for the serene progress of force all types of it, the political, monetary, and

instructive from the old privileged elites to the developing famous elites (Bayat, A. 2007). This is the change sneaking behind the emergency from which the distinctive administrative-based society endures as of now.

OBJECTIVES OF THIS RESEARCH STUDY:

There are many common objectives of this research paper but in terms of learning accessibility there are a few main objectives which are:

1. to identify the concept of secularism, Islam, and democracy
2. to recognize and discern the current view of scholars regarding Islam and democracy as well as secularism and Islam
3. to clarify the understandable reflection of the political democracy and liberal democracy
4. To justify the global observation on Islam, Democracy, and secularism.

BACKGROUND OF THIS RESEARCH STUDY:

Liberal democratic rules system requires a type of secularism to support itself, yet all the principal political, social, and scholarly assets at the removal of Muslim leftists today are religious (Özyürek, E. 2005). This research study looks to disentangle this mystery. Throughout doing as such, this exploration paper difficulties the broadly held presumption in the sociologies that strict governmental issues and liberal-majority rule improvement are incompatible (Roy, O. 2007). Three key these thoughts should be socially developed. In the setting of an arising liberal democracy, how secularism becomes indigenized as a feature of the political culture is a significant and frequently disregarded part of this discussion. We contend that a mainstream agreement frequently arises because of a commitment with and a change of strict thoughts toward legislative issues.

Normatively, secularism ought not to be forced by the state on society however ought to arise base up, from the inside common society, given democratic exchange and dealing over the appropriate part of religion in governmental issues. As such, in creating social orders where religion is a critical marker of character, all together for strict gatherings to accommodate themselves with secularism, a strictly based hypothesis of secularism is required. Similarly huge are the various models of secularism that liberal democracy may oblige. The literature on the democratic hypothesis is especially frail in explaining the exact relationship and boundaries of concurrence between religion and liberal democracy (Montgomery, D. W & Heathershaw, J. 2016). How we characterize secularism is a significant piece of this discussion. We contend in this examination paper that there is more noteworthy space for adaptability on this subject than is by and large recognized, and therefore, a reconsidering of the connection between secularism and a liberal vote-based system is required (Parray, T. A. 2010). This is particularly significant with regards to propelling a liberal-Democratic hypothesis for Muslim social orders, given that religion is a vital marker of personality for a critical level of the populace and secularism has an upset legacy. In social orders where religion is a marker of personality, the way to liberal Democracy, whatever different exciting bends in the road it makes, can't stay away from passing through the doors of religious Politics (Selby, J. 2016). While standard sociology hypothesis has since quite a while ago kept up that religious legislative issues and democratization/progression are contradictory, a basic perusing of the chronicled record recommends something else.

Generally, the advancement of liberal democracy in the West (particularly in the Anglo-American custom) arose not in exacting resistance to religious governmental issues yet frequently working together with it. In some long-standing liberal democracies, banter over the spot of religion in the polis were probably the most fervently challenged and disruptive issues (Kubba, L. 1996). Democratic exchange and haggling over the regulating job of religion in government were an inalienable piece of this development cycle. The conspicuousness of strict legislative issues especially in the open arena is a significant piece of the set of experiences and battle for the liberal vote-based system that has been undervalued by fair scholars (particularly while remarking on the legislative issues of the Muslim world after 11 September 2001).

[Pure fact is: In light of the Islamic rules, controls, and writings, the act of affecting dread within the hearts of defenseless civilians, the discount pulverization of buildings and properties, the bombarding and damaging of guiltless men, ladies, and children are all illegal and abhorrent acts concurring to Islam and the Muslims. Muslims take after a religion of peace, leniency, and pardoning, and the tremendous larger part has nothing to do with the rough occasions a few have related with Muslims. In case a person Muslim were to commit an act of fear-mongering, this individual would be blameworthy of damaging the laws of Islam]].

The essential hypothetical ramifications that streams from this contention that is important for the investigation of liberal majority rule government in Muslim social orders are that the cycle of democratization and progression can't be disengaged from banter about the regulating part of religion in government (Yilmaz, I. 2012)

RELIGION AND DEMOCRACY:

In Democracy in America, Alexis de Tocqueville, writing in 1831 about existence in the early American republic, talks about what he calls the "incredible political issue of our occasions." Tocqueville's essential crowd, it ought to be recollected, were not Americans yet rather the informed classes in his local Europe, whose political issues molded his cognizance, particularly in his local France. As per Tocqueville (Elshtain, J. B. 2009), "the association and the foundation of majority rules system in Christendom is the extraordinary political issue of our times." This perception, albeit 178 years of age, helps us that the issue to remember religion's relationship with the majority rules

system is not only a Muslim phenomenon yet one that other religious customs Christianity specifically has needed to battle with. To the degree that Tocqueville's perception is right, it could be extrapolated that in the very sense that the "incredible political issue" confronting Europe in the nineteenth century was the topic of majority rules system in Christian terrains in the twenty-first century, seemingly the incredible issue of our time is the foundation and association of vote based system in the Muslim world. In the voluminous insightful writing that is created yearly on democratic theory, there has been meager notice of religion's relationship to democracy as of not long ago (Swatos, W. H. (Ed.). 1994). In three as of late distributed "popular government perusers," altered by conspicuous researchers in the field, the topic of religion's relationship to democracy and its legitimate job in political society has been to a great extent settled in the West (the United States being a questionable special case). A wide common agreement exists inside what's more, among Western liberal democracies on this inquiry, and any leftover pressure is arranged utilizing existing democratic cycles and establishments that appreciate wide authenticity. The equivalent can't be said for most Muslim social orders (Vlas, N., & Gherghina, S. 2012).

The strain among religion and the popular government is pretty much as old as the political way of thinking itself. Review that majority rule Athens welcomed Socrates to preliminary on two charges: ruining the personalities of the youthful and strict irreverence. It stays a matter of question among history specialists whether Socrates' informers were more concerned with his supposed strict violations or his political ones. In the advanced period, from the outset, the connection between religion and the democracy system appears to be innately opposing and conflictual (Boyle, K. 2004). The two ideas talk to various parts of the human condition. Religion is an arrangement of convictions and customs that is identified with the heavenly and the sacrosanct. In this sense, it is firmly mystical and supernatural in its directions. While religions may vary in their different signs, most religions share these highlights (Tarusarira, J., & Ganiel, G. 2016). The majority rule government then again is firmly this common, mainstream, and egalitarian. Despite the strict conviction, race, or doctrine, the majority rules system (particularly its liberal variation) suggests a balance of rights and treatment under the watchful eye of the law for all residents without segregation.

It is intended for the peaceful executives of human issues to make an easy street on this planet, not in the great beyond. Fundamentally, in contrast to strict instructions, the standards of the democratic system can be changed and revised. It is exactly the comprehensive nature of vote based system that isolates it from religion and religiously based political frameworks (Gill, A. 2002). One approach to conceptualize the hypothetical pressure among religion and the vote-based system is to envision an even and vertical hub. As the chart underneath illustrates, religion is essentially an upward connection between an individual and their God (Shiffrin, S. 1998). In its most essential structure, it need not affect or concern different citizenry. The popular government on the other hand is an arrangement of political associations that generally suggests a horizontal relationship among people in the public arena (Stepan, A. C. 2000). Its essential definition is void of any reference to the heavenly or the extraordinary. A state of strain emerges where these lines become crossed. An undeniable place of rubbing is when citizenry tries to add their upward relationship with maker into the flat open arena as a way of managing social connections. At the end of the day, when the ethical establishment of real political authority is not, at this point dependent on the even pivot (popular sovereignty) yet changes in the course of the upward hub (divine sway), democracy is undermined (Kitcher, P. 2008).

This is the main motivation behind why strict politics is considered contradictory to democratic legislative issues and why majority rule scholars demand that a liberal-democratic country requires a retreat or separation of religion from legislative issues. The issue with religious politics from the viewpoint of the liberal-democratic hypothesis is frequently supported on the accompanying grounds. Religion claims to be in control of general certainties. The philosophical unbending nature regularly connected with this strict conviction sabotages resilience, pluralism, and bargain all critical parts of liberal-democratic politics. Second, religion is exclusionary because it sets up inconceivable boundaries among adherents and nonbelievers. Vote based system then again is comprehensive, egalitarian, and nondiscriminatory; citizenship did not depend on adherence to the creator but instead on enrollment in political society. Third, religion sabotages the common request of society that is expected to support liberalism and keep a democratic harmony. At the end of the day, it looks to fall the qualification between the flat and vertical tomahawks by hauling creator from the magnificent statures and infusing creator into the focal point of public discussion. The threat to minorities from religious dominant parts is especially notable here. These perceptions are verifiable today in a significant part of the writing on liberal Democratic hypothesis. They fit with a comprehension of religion's part in a liberal society dependent on the got intelligence from the European Enlightenment (Sullivan, K. M. 1992).

POLITICAL MODERNIZATION THEORY AND RELIGION:

The overwhelming case of the modernization hypothesis is that financial advancement is connected to lucid and unsurprising changes in social and sociopolitical life. As the general public pushes ahead and makes a progress from an agrarian-based economy to a modern one, this prompts word-related specialization, higher education rates, what's more, developing pay levels. The social changes that outcome from this cycle leads to changes in sex jobs, perspectives toward power, and socially acceptable sexual behaviors; declining birthrates; and at last more prominent political cooperation (Breuer, S. 1998). From an expansive perspective, the cycle of modernization implies supplanting old examples of thought, activity, affiliation, and belief with new ones. When understudies in the sociologies read the persuasive works in the Western group, from Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau to Hegel, Mill, and Marx, they are doing as such against the scenery and advancement of innovation in Europe. This cycle of social change and advancement

was natural to Europe (Schroeder, R. (Ed.). 2016). With regards to many creating social orders, notwithstanding, the social changes that modernization brought was to a great extent not an aftereffect of a native interaction as it was in As far as the scholastic writing about Third World advancement is concerned, its beginnings date back about 50 years to when two significant measures matched: the development of the United States as a superpower and the decolonization of enormous pieces of Africa and Asia after World War II.

The political macro phenomena of social change and monetary advancement of these locales got new consideration from the U.S. government whose recently discovered superpower status extended its public advantages internationally (Crouch, C., & Streeck, W. (Eds.). 2006). The rise of this improvement in international relations was expanded financing for the investigation of the Third World in the United States, which showed itself most fundamentally in crafted by the American Social Science Research Council Board of trustees on Comparative Politics. The assemblage of writing that rose out of this council gave a solid impulse to hypothesis development and set the boundaries for standard scholarly discussion of the issues of political advancement in the Third World. By and large, this group of grants is known as the "modernization theory," and it is mentally obligated to the speculations of Max Weber and Talcott Parsons. The attention on secularization is critical to this exploration conversation. While there was no single solid "modernization theory" but instead "speculations," most political modernization scholars verifiably bought into the view that a center issue distressing advancement in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East was that these social orders were unreasonably "conventional" and could just push ahead utilizing an interaction of modernization. As such, the supplanting of traditional patterns of thought, conviction, propensity, and custom with mainstream reasonable reasoning was required (Agrama, H. A. 2012).

Conventional social orders were believed to be static and constant; the cadence of life in them was viewed as a roundabout, not direct and reformist; imagination what's more, development were believed to be nonexistent; and religion was seen as a huge obstruction to advance since it advanced thoughts of passivity, odd notion, and power. The secularization proposal is subsequently the sine qua non of modernization hypothesis, as religion drawing on a key aphorism of Enlightenment liberal idea was viewed as the very exemplification of custom. As Donald E. Smith noted more than a quarter-century prior addressing the prevailing perspective at that point, which remains to a great extent unchallenged "Political improvement incorporates, as one of its essential cycles, the secularization of nations, and the reformist rejection of religion from the political system (Ardic, N. 2012). "

ISLAM, MODERNIZATION, AND DEVELOPMENT:

The ascent of Islamic fundamentalism toward the finish of the 20th century was a confounding improvement for some spectators of the Middle East. It appeared to affirm the most exceedingly terrible biases and generalizations about Islam and Muslims (Esposito, J. L. 2011). . How could enormous quantities of individuals, in the period of common explanation, toward the finish of the 20th century recognize in a particularly significant manner with an assailant rendition of religion as the essential wellspring of their personality? This not just tested the gotten insight of both the Enlightenment and sociology hypothesis yet additionally offered belief to an "essentialist" and reductive understanding of Muslim legislative issues that were purportedly overwhelmed by an enemy of democratic center arrangement of qualities (Bangstad, S. 2009). Bernard Lewis, Ernest Gellner, and Martin Kramer are three unmistakable agents of this way of thinking. The development of fundamentalism in the Muslim world rather than liberal democracy is regularly clarified as an element of the exceptional idiosyncrasies of Islamic civilization (Ali, S. 2009). Despotism as indicated by this theory is at the very center of the Muslim confidence, as it requests accommodation both to God and to the individuals who rule in his name. In a regularly referred to Orientalist buzzword', Islam doesn't perceive a detachment among religion and legislative issues however is an aggregate lifestyle, the ramifications being that an extremist framework is a characteristic situation.

Bernard Lewis clarifies that one justification for the shortfall of liberal democracy in the Muslim world is that Islam debilitates the arrangement of autonomous gatherings that may have tested authoritarian principles. In what is today a standard Orientalist saying, the issues of contemporary Muslim social orders can be situated in middle age Muslim history (Hashemi, N. 2009) (Hashemi, N. 2009). "Islamic law," Lewis expresses, "know Islamic we lawful people; Islamic history shows no committees or Islamic history assemblies or parliaments, nor some other sort of elective or delegate gathering. It is fascinating that the legal scholars never acknowledged the rule of larger part choice there was no point since the requirement for a methodology of corporate choice never arose." Delving further into the historical backdrop of archaic Islam to clarify the contemporary shortfall of popular government, Lewis adds: "the political experience of the Middle East under the caliphs and rulers was one of nearly unrelieved despotism, in which submission to the sovereign was a strict as well as a political commitment, and noncompliance a transgression just as a crime." Ernest Gellner, a transcending figure in the sociologies, also finds the cutting edge issues of political advancement in the Muslim world in a social substance found somewhere down in the chronicles of Muslim society and history (which he accepted that was uniform). As per Gellner, the "High Culture" of the metropolitan ulama (pastorate) and bourgeoisie in Muslim society was portrayed as scriptural and rigid and is standardizing for the metropolitan existence of the whole Islamic world. This is to be stood out from the "low culture" of people Islam, which was more lenient and adaptable. Under present-day conditions, this scriptural rigidity is appropriated at the mass level as a feature of the interaction of political centralization, urbanization, and mass training (Elson, R. E. 2010).

Islamic fundamentalism is hence "the interest for the acknowledgment of this standard and the well-known Support it appreciates comes from the goal to the High Culture by the recently urbanized masses." This clarification of Muslim politics, Gellner contends, is "completely harmonious with the prerequisites of industrialization and political Advancement, as opposed to the beforehand industrializations of the social hypothesis that innovation requires secularization." so, the ascent of Islamic fundamentalism in the late 20th century is a legitimate portrayal of the entirety of Muslim society. 'Fundamentalist' advancement of particularistic philosophies and teachings" ought to be viewed as the "late globe-wide declaration of particularistic thoughts," and ought to be appreciated with regards to "expanding globality." Globalization, in other words, in light of significant changes in innovation and correspondences, has significantly increased familiarity with the majority of societies and ways of life in our world among recently divided and confined populaces (Hoodfar, H., & Sadr, S. 2010). The idea of "identity" at its center is social, around there and bunches characterize themselves correspond and gatherings in the public eye. The more we know about others, the more this powers the inquiry: what is unmistakable about me and my local area in a globalized world? In a generally understood book, Jihad versus Mc World (1995), Benjamin Barber contended this point, explicitly that the ascent of ethno religious nationalism in the late 20th century is a response to the expanding political, monetary, and social reliance of our planet. So, the ascent of particularist characters is an attendant of globalization (Ansari, M. T. (Ed.). 2001). The previous political, social, and sociological bits of knowledge propose a need for a more drawn-out term point of view on the ascent of strict fundamentalism, especially as it identifies with issues of popular government in the Muslim world (Engineer, A. A. 2006).

ISLAM AND DEMOCRACY:

The possibility of the concurrence of popular government and Islam has raised debate among essayists and scholars: from one viewpoint, many present huge exact proof to demonstrate that in Muslim nations, vote based system is either frail or nonexistent and they use religion to clarify this wonder. Others propose that religion can't be utilized to clarify vote-based turn of events, and consequently, they characteristic the absence of majority rules system in Muslim nations not to Islam, but rather to different variables (Mahmood, S. 2011). Many accept that where Islam is available, the popular government can't be. In a research paper entitled Does God Matter, and If So Whose God: Religion and Democratization, John Anderson states, "concerning Islam, it was contended that dependence on a fixed strict content and semi lawful laws, the accentuation on divine power, and the alleged absence of differentiation between the strict and the political domain, all neutralized majority rule advancement." The absence of a majority rule government in Muslim nations is utilized as proof to help this case. Anderson takes note of that except for Turkey and Pakistan feeble 'democracies -, popular government has commonly neglected to be dug in Muslim nations (Anjum, O. 2012).

Many Researchers who emphatically go against the thought that Islam can be viable with democracy. In the book Clash of Civilizations, he more than once attests that Muslim nations are barren ground for the popularity-based turn of events and, thus, the "basic issue for the West isn't Islamic fundamentalism. It is Islam, an alternate development whose individuals are persuaded of the prevalence of their way of life and are fixated on the inadequacy of their force." This leads Muslims to dismiss western qualities, including majority rule government, which leaves them hindered and constrained by a tyrant system Kuo, C. T. 2009). Besides, Huntington recommends that the "general disappointment of liberal majority rule government to grab hold in Muslim social orders is a proceeding and rehashed wonder (Anckar, C. 2011).

This disappointment has its source in any event to a limited extent in the unfriendly idea of the Islamic culture and society to Western liberal ideas," bringing about a conflict among Islam and the West. Huntington recognizes that during the 1970s and 1980s the flood of democratization affected Muslim social orders, yet he recommends that the effect was restricted. His general contention concerning Islam and majority rule government can be summed up in one sentence: "vote based possibilities in Muslim republics are disheartening (Buruma, I. 2010)." Huntington isn't the only one. Another essayist who shares this view is Francis Fukuyama who contends that "there is by all accounts something about Islam, or possibly the fundamentalist rendition of Islam that has been predominant lately, that makes Muslim social orders especially impervious to advancement." Admissions Al-Braizat remarks on this and states, "For Fukuyama innovation is described by foundations like liberal majority rules system and free enterprise Fukuyama utilizes Islam as a 'measuring stick' that offers a simple social essentialist clarification to the shortfall of democracy from a large portion of the Muslim nations. In this he combines with other culturalists censuring Islam for whatever turns out badly in a Muslim country (Portier, P. 2011)." researchers accept that Islam is the explanation Muslim countries are missing modernity and democracy, and hence, it is imperative to test their cases by taking a gander at valid Islamic doctrine and whether it genuinely is contradictory with popular government, and second, by investigating experimental information to reveal Muslim perspectives towards vote based system (Esposito, J. L., et, al. 1996).

ISLAM AND SECULARISM:

Secularism has regularly been seen as an unfamiliar philosophy forced by intruders and propagated by post-pioneer administering elites and comprehended as identical to irreligion or anti-religion. Some Islamic reformists like Ali Abdel Raziq and Mahmoud Mohammed Taha have supported a mainstream state in the sense of political request that doesn't force any single interpretation of sharia on the country. Various Islamic and scholarly creators have contended that there is no strict explanation that would keep Muslims from tolerating secularism in the feeling of

state impartiality toward religion. Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im has contended that a common state based on constitutionalism, basic liberties, and full citizenship is more predictable with Islamic history than present-day dreams of an Islamic state. Defenders of Islamism (political Islam) reject secularist sees that would restrict Islam to the issue of individual conviction and rather advocate for a re-visitation of Islamic law and Islamic political authority.

Various pre-current commonwealths in the Islamic world exhibited some degree of partition among religious and political authority, regardless of whether they didn't stick to the advanced idea of a state with no authority religion or religion-based laws (Chehabi, H. E. 1991). Today, some Muslim-larger part nations characterize themselves as or are viewed as secular, and a considerable lot of them have a double framework wherein Muslims can carry familial and monetary debates to sharia courts. The specific purview of these courts differs from one country to another, yet generally incorporates marriage, separation, legacy, and guardianship. Islamists accept that Islam wires religion and governmental issues, with regularizing political qualities controlled by the heavenly messages. It is contended that this has verifiably been the situation and the secularist/pioneer endeavors at secularizing governmental issues are minimal more than jahiliyyah (obliviousness), kafir (unbelief/betrayal), Trinidad (apostasy), and atheism. "The individuals who took part in common legislative issues were raising the banner of rebel against Allah and his courier."

Most Islamic scholars reprimand secularism as stringently disallowed in Islamic custom. The Saudi Arabian Directorate of Iffta', Preaching and Guidance has given a mandate announcing that whoever accepts that there is a direction (Huda) more amazing than that of the Prophet, or that another person's standard is superior to his is a kafir. It records various explicit fundamentals which would be viewed as a genuine takeoff from the statutes of Islam, culpable as per Islamic law. For instance: The conviction that human-made laws and constitutions are better than the Shari'a. The assessment that Islam is restricted to one's connection with God, and has nothing to do with the day by day issues of life. To dislike the use of the hudud (legitimate disciplines declared by God) that they are contradictory in the cutting edge age. What's more, whoever permits what God has denied is a kafir. In the perspective on Tariq al-Bishri, "secularism and Islam can't concur besides through talfiq [combining the regulations of more than one school, i.e., falsification], or by each getting some distance from its actual importance." In certain nations, the dread of the Islamist takeover utilizing majority rule measures has prompted dictator measures against Islamist ideological groups (Jiang, J. 2020). "The Syrian system had the option to exploit the dread of Islamist coming to the ability to legitimize the gigantic clampdown on the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood." Most secularist czars in the Middle East drew upon the danger of Islamism to legitimize their despotic guideline of government in the worldwide field.

ISLAM SUPPORTS DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT OR NOT:

The principal issue in Huntington and Fukuyama's speculations about 'Islam's undemocratic nature is that that the two of them neglected to comprehend the religion. Anderson relates a critical attribute of a religion that numerous researchers neglect to address (Ciftci, S., et, al. 2019). He writes, For Bentham, the issue with all such 'negative' theories about religion and democratization is that they [treat] 'religions as solid when their center precepts are commonly dependent upon an assortment of schools of understanding; and as permanent when they are famously revisionist despite changing conditions and political current.

In a wide-going exposition distributed in Alfred Stepan proposed that all strict customs were multi-vocal, containing authoritative and scholarly assets that could be called upon on the side of vote based types of administration. In Islam and the Myth of Confrontation, Fred Halliday likewise brings up this issue, To be brought into contention about any vital inconsistency, or besides similarity, among Islam and majority rules system is to acknowledge the bogus reason that there is one valid, customarily settled 'Islamic' response to the inquiry, and that this ageless 'Islam' rules social and political practice (Moaddel, M. 2002). There is no such answer and no such 'Islam.' Numerous authors, barring Huntington and Fukuyama, comprehend that Islam can't be alluded to as one structure. Valid, the ideal, true religion has its political tenet, yet the Islam that is drilled by Muslims throughout the planet may not cling to this credibility. For one, Islam has a few unique groups and various ways of thinking inside every organization: The Shiites contrast from Sunnis, which vary from Ismailis, Sufis, Alawis, and so on. Second, there are huge social and topographical contrasts among Arab and non-Arab, Gulf, non-Gulf Muslims, Middle Eastern, East Asian, or African Muslims: For instance, Iranian Muslims practice and carry out the lessons of Islam uniquely in contrast to Saudi, Bangladeshi, Iraqi, or Turkish Muslims (Cizre, Ü. (Ed.). 2008).

Moreover, Islam's idea of Ijtihad, or autonomous thinking, permits Muslim researchers to decipher or rethink the Islamic laws (to a degree) and devise new understandings dependent on their thinking. The result is that various researchers inside one way of thinking or one organization will arrive at two distinct decisions about the Islamic political custom. This is the reason for "some writers there is nothing of the sort as a solitary Islamic political practice, and they propose that inside the shifting Islamic customs there were abundant scholarly assets for those looking to advance popularity based administration." John Anderson alludes to two essayists, John L. Esposito and John O. Voll, who point out that "it likely could be feasible to draw on Islamic customs that were viable with the center worry of vote based system with interest while permitting it to consider the specific worries of Muslims for acknowledgment of 'unique characters or valid communities.'"¹⁶ Anderson noticed that these two authors, similar to other people, take a gander at the particular ideas of shura (counsel), Ijma (agreement), and ijihad (autonomous thinking) as "providing some intellectual reason for the development of Muslim democracies." Although each of the three ideas is significant

in Islamic jurisprudence and suggests a vote-based culture inside Islam, the most huge and pertinent to this conversation is the idea of shura. The exacting interpretation of shura is the interview. It shows up in the Qur'an, a few times, requesting Muslims to counsel each other about their issues in three circles of society: The political, the monetary, and the social and profound. The refrain that is pertinent to this conversation is in Chapter 42: "And those who answer the call of their Lord and establish worship, and whose affairs are a matter of counsel".

Imam Mohammad Al-Shirazi, an exceptionally unmistakable and recognized Muslim researcher, writes in his book *Shura in Islam*, "Drawing from this sacred section, shura is of two sorts: the first is the Muslim lead representative's discussion of the Muslims about undertakings concerning them, and the second is the counsel among Muslims about how to regulate their issues (Hefner, R. W. (Ed.). 2011). along these lines, it is an obligation on both of the lead representative and the administered." Imam Al-Shirazi relates majority rule upsides of support in government and common society. Popularity based governments can't exist without resident cooperation through races and additionally submissions, and every resident picks the public authority, gathering, or lawmaker that will propel their inclinations in issues around medical care, training, financial aspects, work, public safety, liberal rights, and so forth Moreover, progressed majority rule governments esteem common society and its benefits (Fuller, G. E. 2020).

At the point when residents mingle, they become more associated with society, setting off resident support in the public arena through charitable effort, non-government associations, campaigning, and activism. This thus prompts an expansion in political cooperation. The thought is that a couple of Americans in a bowling alley add to America's democratic system. The idea of shura or discussion is esteemed in Islam and the majority rules system the same. Given this and different ideas, Islam would be nearer to democratic qualities than Huntington recommends. Taking a gander at bona fide Islamic regulation, unmistakably Islam isn't just viable with majority rules system however is probably the most grounded advocate (Diima, B., et, al. 2014). As Simon Bromley expresses, "by different clear standards universalism, scripturalism, otherworldly libertarianism, the expansion of full investment in the consecrated local area, not to one, or a few, but rather to all (Arafat, Z. F. 1988) and the levelheaded systematization of public activity Islam is, of the three incredible Western monotheisms, the one nearest to innovation' and by suggestion in this manner, the one nearest on a basic level to majority rule government." Huntington and Fukuyama's speculations are consequently seriously tested. Islam and Democracy in Empirical Data Huntington have argued that "religious tradition does have an impact upon the likely success of democratization efforts," but empirical testing reveals the contrary. Myunghee Kim recounts the 1995-2001 World Values Survey which found that "Muslims and members from other religions give about the same support for democratic ideals and leadership." She also conducted her research to test the plausibility of assuming that religious commitments will affect democratic attitudes (Stepan, A. C. 2000).

The two variables she uses are "religious commitment" (independent variable) which includes three dimensions theological orthodoxy, confidence in churches, and religious practice, and support for democracy (independent variable) which means that respondents approve the democratic system, believing that it is superior to any other form of government (Tarusarira, J., & Ganiel, G. 2016). Kim's research found that the first variable has "no or limited effect on democratic support," and although "spiritual values may bring meaning and solidarity to an individual, they appear less important for producing democratic attitudes. "She concludes that: "Given the statistical significance of these findings for Protestants and Muslims, Huntington's assertion about the Muslim rejection of democratic beliefs remains unsupported by the survey data from these twenty countries. Neither religious values nor religious practices deeply shape support for democracy (Gill, A. 2002). Instead, other variables such as perceived group threats and political indicators (ideological self-placement and political involvement) wield the greater impact, particularly among industrialized societies (Swatos, W. H. (Ed.). 1994).

Anderson likewise presents information that states that "up to 40 percent of the world's Muslims live in nations that are pretty much democratic frequently as minorities." A more liberal overview distributed in John Esposito's book entitled, *Who Speaks for Islam: What a Billion Muslims Think*, recommends that Muslims amusingly even a significant number of the 7% classing themselves as 'revolutionary' truth be told, respect the West for its vote based system and opportunities. In any case, they don't need such things forced on them (Stout, J. 2009). 'Muslims need self-assurance, yet not an American forced and characterized popular government,' [said Esposito.] 'What the lion's share needs are a vote-based system with strict qualities.' Thus, Muslims themselves don't dismiss majority rule government, as in Huntington cases, and they trust in and try for a political framework that is popularity based (Olayiwola, A. R. O. 1993). Concerning Fukuyama's thought that Islam is contradictory with advancement, and by suggestion, to majority rule government, he is studied by Fares Al-Braizat, who a paper named "Muslims and Democracy: An experimental scrutinize of Fukuyama's culturalist approach." Al-Braizat's exploration tried Fukuyama's hypothesis by utilizing the most recent information accessible for every country from the World Values Survey to test the relationship of two factors: inclination for vote-based system and strictness. His inclination for democratic system variable has three-pointers, two of which are inclination for a popularity based political framework," and "majority rules system is superior to some other type of government (Wolfe, A., & Katznelson, I. (Eds.). 2010). the outcomes negate Fukuyama's hypothesis just as Huntington's.

For the principal pointer, Al-Braizat found that "predominantly Islamic social orders show extremely undeniable degrees of help for a [democratic political system] as an awesome method of overseeing their nations, while at the same time showing significant degrees of religiosity." Among the Muslim nations with high help for a

popularity-based political framework are Egypt, Iran, Turkey, and Jordan. Concerning the subsequent marker, Al-Braizat saw that "support for vote based system (majority rule government is superior to some other type of government) is exceptionally high in Islamic social orders; with Bangladesh, 98%, Jordan 89%, Turkey 88% contrasted with the UK 78% USA 87%, and Canada 87%."29 Although the measurements he describes may appear to be fairly misrepresented, the general assumption is that Muslim social orders don't dismiss majority rule government, however, despite what might be expected, they embrace it. Hence, Al-Braizat reasons that the "general pattern in the connection among strictness and backing for majority rule government is negative and immaterial. Overall, Islamic social orders: Bangladesh, Turkey, Morocco, Egypt, and Jordan are not novel in showing significant degrees of help for vote based system all the while with undeniable degrees of strictness." He at last expresses, "Fukuyama's case about Islam as impervious to democracy, to say the least, is truly tested." It is in this manner clear that religion can't be utilized to clarify democratic advancement since it is superfluous (Thiemann, R. F. 1996).

ELECTIVE EXPLANATIONS:

We have discovered that Islam is viable with democracy and Muslim's mentalities are positive towards it, yet all around, Muslims favor a democratic political framework over different frameworks. Furthermore, even though Huntington and Fukuyama fizzled in their presumption that Islam prevents popularity-based turn of events, they effectively brought up the absence of majority rule government in the Muslim world (Minkenberg, M. 2007). If Islam isn't the reason for this majority rule inadequacy, what is? What represents Muslim nations' dismissal of the majority rules system? What's more, what elements assume a critical part in molding the political practices of Muslim nations? Researchers have offered numerous expected clarifications to these inquiries, three of which are negative sentiments towards the West, financial turn of events, and dictator authority (Mantilla, L. F. 2010). Since Muslim nations' authentic encounters have been enormously affected by the West, Muslims have created negative sentiments towards it. Western imperialism, war, misuse, and political obstruction in the Middle East prompted a dug in the sensation of doubt, dread, and weakness. Since democracy is by and large considered as a result of the West, the nations of the Middle East have been hesitant to acknowledge a Western democracy (Chhibber, P. K., & Shastri, S. 2014).

Huntington calls attention to that "the West's synchronous endeavors to universalize its qualities and organizations, to keep up its military and economic superiority, and to mediate in clashes in the Muslim world create extreme disdain among Muslims." As noted beforehand, Esposito's research discovered that Muslims don't need a Western-forced majority rule government and like to construct their variant of a vote-based framework that would address their issues and concerns as opposed to Western interests (Alemika, E. E., & Okoye, F. 2002). Moreover, "[Muslims] see Western culture as materialistic, bad, debauched, and corrupt. They additionally consider it to be enticing, and consequently stress even more the need to oppose its effect on their lifestyle." These negative pictures related to the West, to some degree overstated by Huntington, further affect Muslims' acknowledgment of a Western democratic system that may exceed their way of life or religion through certain liberal rights like sexual direction and early termination. In like manner, the majority rules system itself is acknowledged by Muslims, yet certain Western qualities related to the popular government are not. Subsequently, even though religion doesn't thwart democracy in the Muslim world, certain socio-social components in Muslim social orders keep them from unequivocally tolerating democracy (Maddox, G. 2012). One driving element to the absence of a majority rules system in the Muslim world is the presence of incredible and threatening tyrant systems. In such cases, albeit the residents long for popular government, the current system rejects democracy to secure its force and interests. Consequently, some will contend that the focal point of vote-based examination ought not to be on social preconditions, but instead on key social and political entertainers.

This is significant for the Muslim world which is spooky by tyrant systems and tyrannies. "People in Islamic societies will, in general, have an inclination towards democracy however what makes it less workable for them to accomplish popularity based political governance is the idea of the exaggerated, exaggerated, and overstretched state structure and the ponderous tyrant systems (much of the time) in power as of now." A few words and ideas obtain such boundless change that they become 'clear', even natural, and yet hard to characterize! 'democratic system' is one such idea; for, when we utilize this word, we mean something by it, in any case, when we ask ourselves 'What precisely is it that we mean?', we suddenly lose our volubility (Zoubir, Y. H. 1998). All we sense is that we are looking for something that we envisioned we knew, just to find that it is tangled in the limit, existing in a condition of clarity, which permits one to see neither through it nor inside it. Considering this, a study of this current word's set of experiences may help us in understanding its exact significance. Be that as it may, regardless of whether we did this, we would, in any case, come to a similar result: that the idea of democracy changes and develops persistently, getting from the relentless development of recorded advancement.

POLITICAL DEMOCRACY:

Without Equality Nonetheless, democracy isn't simply about the election, even though the election is a sort of democracy. In any case, for a political decision to be real, it should be based on democratic establishments! That is, based on uniformity in potential, opportunity, and means, in any case, the democracy which looks to choose those who might administer individuals can just prompt leaders of a solitary layer or class: the ceaselessly managing class which works in a condition of imbalance. Democracy in the Western present reality implies, first, political opportunity to empower residents to satisfy their political race 'obligation'; and, second, monetary (liberal) opportunity, to

empower each individual, genuine or allegorical, to do their financial movement as indicated by their methods and potential, with no limitations forced on opportunity and lead, and without any control on any part of this action (Bollen, K. A. 2017). The inescapable result of such a democracy is a 'non-majority rules system, since 'political opportunity' and 'monetary opportunity', although opportunities are just opportunities for the individuals who approach them. What's more, since outrageous the dissimilarity among the country's people is the essential trait of the present society, just the 'elite' profits by political and financial opportunity. In this way, political election and liberal majority rules system just lead to non-democracy. Exclusively the capitalists are in a situation to benefit themselves from these opportunities, and are, accordingly, without any help working out 'the right to rule individuals and to hold influence over their assets and fate (Zamosc, L. 2007). The mastery of a specific class was once one of 'lawful' compulsion, yet presently, by the excellence of democracy, it has gotten one of 'decision' drawn from the political race, 'delighted in' by the entire country. In addition to the transition to democracy is the fundamental issue confronting the nations of what was known as the 'Third World from one viewpoint, and those that made up the 'Communist Bloc' on the other? Because of the intricacies of this issue and of the endeavors to tackle it, notwithstanding its interconnection with inside, common and global circumstances, and social, monetary, political, social, and ethnic contemplations, it is by all accounts genuinely the 'issue of the age'. This is given its interconnected hypothetical and useful measurements, its inside, emotional components, and its outer, target ones (Bowman, K., & Mahoney, J. 2005). The transition to democracy is a hypothetical issue which can be for the most part summarized in the accompanying inquiry: Bearing at the top of the priority list that democracy is the aftereffect of entrepreneur mechanical improvements in Europe, how might there be a change to democracy in social orders encountering circumstances by and large related either to a [stage of] pre-capitalism or to what in particular was considered to be an option in contrast to it (state economy and socialist tests), or to circumstances which are a combination of both?

Additionally, the transition to democracy represents a pragmatic issue which might be expressed as follows: This change should be accomplished by the rulers themselves, who, thus, should surrender their forces and advantages 'of their own unrestrained choice'. This may have happened on more than one occasion, however, this is the special case for the standard (Dworkin, R. 2008). The option is to constrain those rulers to move to one side, which requires the development of democratic powers in the society, fit of authorizing democracy, and of protecting against the ascent of another sort of undemocratic standard. At the end of the day, the transition to democracy might be accomplished in one of two ways. The first is moderate and 'progressive'. It gives the democratic powers in the public arena an opportunity to develop and set up themselves, while attempting to democratize the state by changing it into a condition of genuinely agent establishments, which requires the division of forces, regarding freedoms, and so forth. The second is for the democratic controls either to pressure the ruler into venturing down or to eliminate him forcibly. The issue with the last measure is that the democratic powers can't typically cut down an arrangement of government except if they change into undemocratic forces (Sadri, A. 2000).

For example, they may turn into a coordinated, secret, progressive development of an aggressor nature, or transform into careless, chaotic powers, discovering articulation as a far-reaching mainstream development or in common defiance, and so on does that imply that a progressive change is more secure and safer? In principle, it is so. Be that as it may, 'change' involves applying a standard, a continuous development that requires some serious energy and advances in stages. How might we ensure its progression and protect against its destruction to guarantee the wellbeing of the vote-based interaction itself? Moreover, how might we keep the speed of this steady development as far as possible and stay away from its crumbling into a 'forever brief' one? Who can shield against the relapse of this slow just interaction into the past undemocratic condition of undertakings? An activity of gradualism in transitioning into democracy implies a consistent depriving of the advantages of influence and abundance from an entirety class, a semi-class, a group, a family, or the unparalleled party. Along these lines, who can guarantee that those advantaged classes would 'comprehend' and not respond in a way that would imperil or cut short the interaction of gradualism? These humiliating worries and questions are not unnecessary or skeptical theories. They have their defense in occasions and encounters saw in such countless endeavors of progress to democracy in numerous African, Asian, Latin American, and Eastern European nations. In Sudan, the non-democratic rule was cut down, a few times, through the preparation of the majority in the city by public resistance powers. In any case, straightforwardly or a brief time later, the interaction consistently finished with the arrival of the undemocratic rule, now and again by the military under public and progressive guises. On different occasions it came because of the disappointment of the democratic parties, themselves, to comply with democracy, which opened the path before the 'salvation' wannabes, by undemocratic methods. What occurred in Algeria is the basic information: the decision power meddled and impeded the transition to democracy part of the way through. At that point came the rehashed statements and implications that the powers which were expected to win the decisions had no goal to regard the 'round' of democracy when in power.

CONCLUSION:

The democratic system, at that point, actually should be set up in the contemporary Arabian heart. It actually should be changed, inside the Arab state heart, from an issue encompassed by questions to a relentless conviction, similar to the conviction of the psyche concerning principal necessities. How might we, at that point, understand this troublesome undertaking? Among the realities that in one way or another have debilitated and misshaped the picture of popular government in the Islamic state's inner voice are the mutilation and adulteration which have tormented the

parliamentary experience in the Islamic administrative Nation (Saward, M. 1998). Added to this are simply the blemishes of the parliamentary framework, which are effortlessly exacerbated in social orders not yet created to meet the required standard for the sound application, in any event moderately, of the democratic framework. In any case, the debasement in certain parliamentary encounters, just as the blemishes of the majority rules system itself, regardless of how genuine the two of them are, ought to not be taken as an affection to decry democratic system, as the solitary other option would be fascism and mistreatment. There is no third option to the blemishes of democracy and those of fascism and abuse. The last-mentioned ought to be destroyed totally and supplanted by democracy, and the previous might be reduced by embracing more democracy. Concerning the 'fair tyrant' or the 'alluring pioneer', if one somehow happened to be found, there is no ensure that his replacement would continue in his means. Accordingly, insight orders not to wager on what may come and may never come (Khatab, S., & Bouma, G. D. 2007). The lone bet that has sure outcomes, regardless of how long it might require or what battle it may require, is the wagered of the democratic system. Notwithstanding, democracy doesn't include the parliamentary framework just, so we ought not to pin it on every one of the imperfections and the bends of this system. Democracy requires, most importantly, the regard for human rights, democratic rights, for example, the right of articulation, of establishing social orders also, parties, of development, work, balance, equity, and so on These democratic rights can't be undermined; they are over the parliamentary framework and are free of reasonable or one-sided decisions, bad or untainted parliamentary life. It is miserable to see our kin reticent about the relinquishment of these rights, under some trademark, or in light of dread or lack of interest. This implies that human rights need to be set up in the Arab heart, just as to flourish in person also, aggregate lead, in the instructive framework and each part of public activity. This research result accepts that human improvement within the Middle Easterner and Islamic world should concentrate on creating, to begin with, and first human rights as indicated by the Quran and Hadith. These rights are proper to life and its satisfaction, the rights to conviction, to information, to oppose this idea, to the discussion, to correspondence and equity, in addition to the rights of the oppressed. And these are the essential rights which, on the off chance that they are not delighted in by people, implies the shariah disciplines cannot be connected equitably.

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1. Research Manager at Shah Legal Aid and Research Centre, E-mail: smofjubaer@gmail.com
<https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5230-2030>
2. Islamic Scholar Email: shahahmedsaeh@gmail.com
3. Senior Researcher at Shah Legal Aid and Research Centre, E-mail: haqshariful563@gmail.com
4. Junior Researcher at Shah Legal Aid and Research Centre, E-mail: shablua44@gmail.com
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