

Available Online at: https://www.scholarzest.com

Vol. 2 No. 9, September 2021

ISSN: 2660-5589

A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF MAHSUD AND AFRIDI TRIBE RESISTANCE MOVEMENT AGAINST THE BRITISH 1849-1897

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Article history:

Abstract:

Received: 7th July 2021
Accepted: 7th August 2021
Published: 22th September 2021

Poor and enriched with the philosophy of Jihad bound to chivalrous culture and religious obligations; Pathans are a strange fascination to talk about and live with. Jihad or rhetorically religious violence has a long history in frontier tribes. The tribal region comprising Northern Western Frontier Province (NWFP) was important for the British because of its strategic location which hindered British through political upheavals. Regional events were closely connected with religious doctrines. British received forceful armed religious vigour by the tribes of NWFP. British treated this pan-Islamic sentiment severely through military expeditions. This research paper aims to assess the resistance movement of *Mahsud* and Afridi tribes against British rule. British colonial experience (1849 to 1947) suggests interagency operation to complete a certain course of action in these areas. In this research paper, we aim to investigate the origin, culture, geography, British advent, early relations, British expeditions and their impact, Malik system setup, British strategies and the response of Mahsud and Afridi tribes. This research describes the economic, social and political organizations of these two tribes along with their cultural attention which reflects rivalry, patriarchal parallels and egalitarian ethos. British always regarded Mahsud raiding a threat and persistent problem which lead British to lead with the tribal belt by imposing tribal responsibility, indirect subsidies and improved position but interestingly the tension within the tribes' lead to "Second Anglo-Afghan War". Earlier efforts brought fruitful outcomes where Darvish Khel Wazirs started cultivating the land in *Bannu* and graze flocks but British clumsy handling attributed to a serious crisis in the 1870s. British furthered the process of better tribal management. This research analyzes the strategic, economic, social, political and cultural influences on *Mahsud* and Afridi tribes for their effectiveness. The significance of the Northern Western Frontier region has always centred around its culture and politico-militia. Government of India (GOI) tried to control tribal issues through civilization influence by motivating tribes to start trade with British, join military and use other public departments in their benefit. British Pashtun civilization model was very different than their culture to wane Pashtuns towards the century but the response of Pashtuns turned more ambivalent. British found Pashtun vengeful fanatics and treacherous: whereas, British also admired them for their resourceful character, bravery and for their stand for what they spoke. Tribes may not fit into stereotype perceptions called noble savages while living in their splendid isolation but they remained consistent to Pashtunwali code. British Officials remained engaged with both the tribes for better tribal management by establishing their control across the frontier zone. Tribes managed to rule out the barbarous tactics of Sikhs and vigorous response to the limit of insult but the importance of social and economic tribal organization was also an important parallel with the honour and prestige of the government. Independent tribes got engaged with the British along with negotiation and agreements with *Mahsud* and Afridi tribes.

Keywords: Tribe, British, Mahsud, Afridi, Pashtunwali, Tribal Management, Geography, Expeditions, Socio-economic and Socio-political.

INTRODUCTION

Common religion leads to the unity of diversified Muslims under the movement of Pan-Islamism (Lee, 1942). Islamic teachings are full of references about Muslim brotherhood and being good for fellow Muslims. In the parallel existence of Umayyad caliphate, Muslim scholars never opposed the existence of more than one Muslim states over the globe. Although, Muslim enthusiasts cherish for Muslim Ummah (political, spiritual and territorial unity of Muslims). The unity of Muslims under one rule is desired but not sought as a religious obligation. The people of NWFP take inspiration from religion and culture as it affects their thinking and feeling. NWFP was the most important strategic province but the British policies toward Pashtuns proved antagonistic. Throughout history, whosoever ruled NWFP also ruled Delhi. In 1849, the British came into direct contact with Afghanistan and Pashtuns after the defeat of Sikh. Afghanistan was a gateway of politico-militia penetration into Central Asia, China and Iran. British also tried to invade Afghanistan in 1878 to have an upper hand over Russia to safeguard their attacks (Obhrai, 1983). British fought three wars (1839, 1878 and 1919) for Kabul but they hardly managed to keep Kabul as their satellite (Dupree, 1967). Ethnic and religious bond of NWFP and Afghanistan proved a strong resistant against British in almost every part of British influence in NWFP, especially against tribes. The extension of British rule in tribal areas was not a piece of cake as it was in other parts of India. British launched several expeditions but they were doomed to heavy losses. Pashtuns drew immense inspiration from their religion against British occupation. People of NWFP were direly aggrieved on the devastation of Islamic grandeur in Turkey. British faced serious hindrance and confrontation right from their arrival in 1849 in tribal areas. British strategically engaged individual tribes which were int heir interest but in 1897 British also witnessed when all tribes stood united against their rule. Every tribesman from Malakand to Kurram was armed and ablaze to confront the British (Mills, 1979). The Pashtun leadership SaadUllah Alias Mad Mullah, NajamUddin Alias Hada Mullah, Mawlana Hamza Khan, MohyUddin Alias Mullah Powindah and Sayyed Akbar of Khyber agency lead uprising against the British with the fighting force of 200,000-armed tribesman (Macmann, 1978 and Obhari, 1983). The cause of Pashtuns uprising against the British was multifaceted based on the demarcation of "Durand Line" which showed British policy of dividing Pashtuns between Afghanistan and British India for the upkeep of their "Divide and Rule - 1893" policy, exclusion of tribes from political administration, the imposition of tax on the salt rock in Kohat, threatening the culture by introducing churches and schools and instigation of Afghan government against the British rule. Pashtuns also invaded infidels as a result of the war between Greeks and Turks at Thessaly and Afghan operations against Kafiristan. In a nutshell, the British kept on expanding their malicious intents as they got settled. British took some serious steps which directly confront with the cultural and religious ideologies of the tribes specially Mahsud's and Afridi's. British troops were attacked in their forts in Maude, Landi Kotal, Samana, Shabqadar, Chakdara and Malakand. British were seriously wounded and bore heavy losses of men and material. British retaliation even fanned the fire as their attacks killed thousands of Pashtuns, imposed fines, burnt houses and villages, put economic restrictions, confiscated swords and rifles. Sympathies of the locals increased with Pashtuns. Honour always remained primary to the religious and cultural doctrines of Pashtuns. They hardly allowed an outsider to rule and command their lands, infiltrate their culture and mutilate their religious doctrines. They maintained their chivalrous code at the cost of their lives. The organization of tribes is crucially based on the intrinsic element of "Honour" – primary to their culture. Honour and poverty form the basis of tribal cultural clash and factionalism. Tribal life revolves around certain cultural traits which include honour, courage, loyalty, bravery, family and women protection. Studies have shown that tribes follow honour even on the cost of their life. This research also looks into the honour keeping by feuds of Mahsud and Afridi tribes. The confrontation between state and tribes has always remained a burning issue in the mainstreaming and development of tribes.

COMPARISON BETWEEN THE ORIGIN, CULTURE AND GEOGRAPHY OF THE TWO TRIBES

Obscurity shrouds the Pashtun origin and legends consider themselves a descendent of Semitic origin. According to the modern genealogists, Pashtuns are mix race descending from Turks, Indo-Aryan, Huns and others who invaded the region. Afghans consider their race a descendent of Israel but they feel insulting being called Jew - Yahoodi. Any person who speaks or understand the Pashto language is termed as Pakhtun or Pashtun. Pashtun is generic for five population divisions who are the dwellers of Pathanland include Karani, Beitani, Matti, Ghurghushti and Sarabani. Tribes speaking and understanding Pashto like Hazaray Wal, Mashwanis, Swatis and Tanolis residing in Pashtun areas follow Pashtunwali – an unwritten code of conduct. At present, Pashtun refers to Pathan race dwelling in Northern Western Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Eastern Afghanistan, Federally Administered Tribal Area (now merged in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) and Northern Western province of Baluchistan. The major chunk of *Mahsud* tribe lives in Waziristan making a rough triangle between Northern Razmak, Jandola and Shuidar to Janimela (North of Wana). Surrounded by Shranis, Wazirs and Bhittanis no boundary of Mahsud's is in contact with settled districts (Tribal Hierarchy & Dictionary of FATA -Pakistan, 2005). No Mahsud owns land outside of South Waziristan Agency. Mahsud's find refuge in lower valleys in the cold season while setting their living in tents and caves. Few of them are also scattered in Logar Valley (Afghanistan), Mokhand and Chark. Mahsud groups are also settled near Tank, Gumal and Landidak (Bannu) (Wylly, 1912). Mahsuds own natural territorial ambushes against invaders in the geographically isolated valleys and mountains which protect them from outsiders and invaders which provide – their defensive positions and hiding places are excellent (Robson,

1919). Their main towns are Makin and Kaniguran. The temperatures are cool in winter and hot in summer with modest rainfall in the zone. Mahsud's are Muslims believers of Sunni – Hanafi sect. Mahsud tribe follows a migratory pattern of climbing down to caves in the lower valleys in winter and back to the higher compounds in summer. *Mahsud* and Wazir tribes sensed the shifting politico-militia realities and they together confronted the British (Skeen, 1932). The intermixed living of Shaman Khel, Bahlozai and Alizai never allowed any feud in the tribe as they killed those who were blamed spying for the British. They are always at confrontation with neighbouring tribes on the issues of grazing rights. The contest of Razmak territory is still a bone of contention between Mahsuds, Bhittanis and Wazirs. Mahsuds enjoy a long history of insurgency and militancy against all government, political, British and non-Pashtun invading activities. They are considered the most formidable fighting tribe in the frontier region for their raiding, fighting and fiercely independent skills (Robson, 1919). The relevance of Mahsud fighting force is still relevant and young in the anti-US movement in Afghanistan – they are back and alive in field and news (Rashid, 2009). The consideration of all Mahsud equal makes leading Mahsud's a challenge (Robson, 1919). Afridi tribe is another known mention to the list of fighting spirit endowed to their culture and religion. They are primarily located in Peshawar District, Khyber Agency, Jamrud, Bara, Torkham and Landi Kotal. Their territorial stretch is about 450 kilometres with the widest point of 250 kilometres occupying a total area of 27,220 square kilometres sharing boundaries with Peshawar, Nowshera, Malakand, Lakki Marwat, Kohat, Karak, Dera Ismail Khan, Charsadda and Bannu. The central regions of Afridi's cover frontiers of Peshawar and Kohat, Orakzai, Kurram and Khyber agencies. Plain areas and rivers make fertile lands of Mastura, Kurram, Khanki and Bara extensively cultivated. Mahsud and Afridi tribes share similar weather conditions of summer, winter and rainfall. Afridi's are also Muslims following Sunni – Hanafi Sect and Barelvi Sunni faction binding themselves with the pre-Islamic historical practices and rituals; whereas, a large faction is also attracted towards Deoband rhetoric (Abbas, 2006). The hill tribesman is well-armed with profound fighting skills living in tall mud-walled compounds guarded by watchtowers. A dedicated watchtower for each walled compound. Afridi's like other Pashtuns abide by the chief obligations of Pashtunwali code – providing asylum (Nanawateh), revenge doctrine of a tooth for tooth and eye for an eye (Badal) and hospitality to all (Melmastia). Sepah, Zakha Khel, Kuki Khel, Malik Din Khel, Qamber Khel, Kamar Khel, Aka Khel and Adam Khel are eight clans of Afridi tribe. Like Mahsud's, Afridi's also following a migratory pattern by spending summer in Tirah, Maidan and Rajqal valleys; whereas, in winter they settle areas near Peshawar, Kohat and Kajuri; whereas, Adam Khel clan remains static (A Dictionary of The Pathan Tribes on The NWFP of India, 1910). The tribal feud system of Afridi's constitutes on inner-clan rivalries. The British always considered Zakka Khel notoriously untrustworthy. Other clans believe the words of Zakka Khel only if they swore on the Holy Ouran (Lionel, 1898). Even the Afridi origin is unknown but it is believed that they descend from Indian Aryan Buddhist entered in Islam in the 10th century. They have a keen interest in trade, agriculture and smuggling. Dara Adam Khel famous for arms manufacturing and smuggling is under the control of Afridi tribe. Afridi's also led an uprising against the British while seizing Khyber Pass during second Afghan War – 1878. British launched *Tirah* expedition to subdue *Afridi* and other tribes which also ended in the organization of Khyber Rifles. The British accept that Pashtun tribes never subjugated in front of their expeditions and here the British met the race which looked them straight into their eyes. The British treated the tribes with respect and also liberated considerable independence in their internal tribal affairs. Khyber remained under the influence of Maliks, Lundgi holders and Khassadars who never heed a great amount of respect to formal authority but a little. The British also introduced Malik system for better tribal management as a medium between locals and government which is discussed in the coming heading in detail.

TRIBESMEN AND BRITISH EXPEDITIONS

Tribal attitude has never been submissive and peaceful. The strategic context of British Colonial experience in numerous territories like Waziristan was an effort to add more jewels to the British Crown. Role of tribal areas was always critical for expanding Russian territories. The larger part of British inherited territories consisted of independent groups who were accustomed to their cultural limits and intertribal fights. Waziristan and tribes proved a great challenge for British rule in sub-continent after 1849 due to its forbidden terrain and lawless situation along with trouble caused by isolated Mehsud tribes. British prioritized maintenance of peace and harmony in Afghanistan bordering areas as a strategic necessity. British approached tribes through intermediaries by opting a close border strategy. This British close border policy was executed from 1849 to 1894 with periodic punitive expeditions like "Butcher and Bolt". British avoided repression and managed tribal areas as the British lacked the resources which would enable them to exercise their influence over-dispersed forbidden terrain (Hugh, 2002). British avoided the policy of suppression and chose to manage tribal areas because of resources, strategic issues, sociological perceptions, cultural and ideological viewpoints. British feared the shared cultural and religious identity of tribes with Kabul. British had doubts that the Amir of Kabul might help tribes to take control of British occupied territories which restricted the British to continue their policy of limited interference in tribal areas. Even in the scarcity of manpower and monetary resources, the British continued to subdue tribal population by patronage, settlement schemes and punitive expeditions. British dealing with the tribe was indirect - through intermediaries. Lack of resources limited the availability of options to British such as the inclusion of tribesmen in the militia (Michael, 1982). Imperial culture of defending their subjects and fair treatment with the tribes also guided the leading principles of British policy for the tribal areas but any challenge from the tribes was handled forcefully – British believed that innocent should not be punished and suffer for the crimes committed by the cruel and guilty so their dealings with the tribe for most of the part were consistent (Ibid, 25). Although Mehsud's never gathered under the leadership of a single leader their genealogical grounds were strong enough to gather them for the cause. British

exercised their influence from 1849 to 1893 over tribes through their deputy commissioners by the control of certain individuals through Maliks and Jirgas from Bannu and Tank as headquarter of the British administrators. After the annexation with Punjab, the irregular force of Punjab including sapper companies, corps of guides, garrison artillery batteries, light artillery, infantry and cavalry regiments were stained in the cantonments of Dera Ismail Khan, Bannu, Kohat, Asni and Dera Ghazi Khan. The irregular Punjab force along with Sikh local infantry and Sind Camel Corps lessened the First Anglo-Afghan war (1839 to 1842). British interacted with the tribes for more than 20 years from 1859 through Shah Nawaz Khan (Nawab of *Tank*) because of his connections with tribes. The lack of military and monetary resources resulted in a mixed performance by the Nawab of Tank. British deviated from the imperial policy of safeguarding the innocent while handling the wrongdoings and crimes of tribe members. British punishments to tribes included collective punishments, seizure of property, animals and men, punitive expeditions, reverse blockades, taking hostages, levying fines, etc. Tribesmen seriously disliked reverse blockades as they heavily depended on the outer world for their survival – British did use reverse blockades to influence tribal attitude (Nashville, 1912). British did everything to control tribesmen such as enrolling them in the paid militia and paid the settlement in British controlled territory. British were also afraid that the inclusion of tribesmen in militia will prove even challenging soon and causing adversaries for British rule. The Punjab annexation in 1849 leads to a hands-off policy of control over tribesmen by the British. British always restrained themselves from risky operations due to lack of political will, material and personnel. The retaliation of the British government was rare to periodic attacks conducted by Mehsud's in the 1850s. In December 1852, the British killed about one thousand tribesmen along with the seizure of cattle while little resistance was posed to British by Mehsuds (Nashville, 1912). In March 1860, Mehsuds raided Tank with 3,000 tribesmen while British took them before Tank and launched a punitive expedition with 5,000 men and destroyed Mehsud crops and settlements (Sammon, 2008). Mehsud's did not ask for peace until 1861 against the reverse blockade, punitive expeditions and economic difficulties posed by the British. With the construction of British forward frontier posts, tribal sovereignty was challenged which also increased the number of tribal raids on these posts.

British launched 1853 organized expedition against the increasing raids of Afridis who claimed their attention in the east of Kohat Pass while concluding the peace efforts of Sir Collin Campbell in 1850. Colonel S. B. Boileau led the operation in Bori Valley from where these raids originated. Colonel Boileau attacked Afridis with Peshawar Mountain Train Battery, Elephant Transport, Pounder Guns, 22nd Foot Regiment, Corps of Guides, 5th Cavalry, 20th Native Infantry, 66th Gurkhas, Minors and Sappers. British led forces managed to cross the close valley of 12 miles length from a village named Kandao from one end the other troops entered the valley from Sarghasha Pass (The Risings on the North-West Frontier, 1898). These troops faced sharp resistances while entering the valley and also required multiple reinforcements. After destructing the tribesmen troops decided to withdraw while their enemy kept on harassing them on their retirement. In the heavy presence of Afridis, the British troops managed to retire from the valley due to their heavy protection of pounder guns put to escort them while marching in and out. Troops hardly managed to return to their camps – it was a hard day for British troops. As a result of Bori Villages destruction, the tribesmen agreed to an unconditional surrender on 24 February 1854. Although, for some time Mohmands remained quite one of their chiefs "Rahim Dad" was summoned to reach Peshawar. Colonel S. J. Cotton led an expedition against Mohmands while destroying their villages and capturing the cattle in August 1854. This fight was little and short which included Mountain Train battery, 9th Native Infantry, 1st Sikh Infantry, 22nd Foot Companies, 10th Light Cavalry, 22nd Company Miners and Sappers. Afridis claimed the first attention of the garrisons at the end of 1854. Although, few settlements had already been done in the background of the Afghan War as the Afridi and British borders became contagious. A series of depredations were carried out by the tribesmen on the bordering areas of Peshawar which made it difficult for the locals to graze their cattle in the areas which remained in the reach of British. Raid and counterraids continued till the end of 1855 with an unwilling submission of Aka Khel clan to the British Commissioner. British imposed blockade was rigorously observed till a complete settlement between both the parties. Afridis did not take part in the Indian mutiny against British rule except few trivial differences.

Official annexation of Puniab was carried out after the successful conclusion of 1849 Second Sikh War. Troubles between Pashtun and Sikh became an issue for British authorities. Transborder Pashtun assaults and raids became a constant headache for new custodians of the annexed Punjab which was not possible for the Sikhs to prevent (Barthorp, 1982). British adopted the conciliation policy to administer these issues by keeping intact the recognition and independence of the British. British officials adopted a friendly approach towards tribes and they also restrained their officials to enter tribal territory – close border policy (Moreman, 1998). East India Company was worried because of the well-armed Pashtun tribesmen confrontations in ceaseless successions. British feared that if these tribes are not opposed than they might threaten districts of Indus which will require a great force to stop these tribesmen (Punjab Administration Report, 1849-52). British Punjab Irregular Force (PIF) to perform legendary duties across the frontier. British Officers were convinced by the finest fighting skills of Pashtun tribesmen. Punjab Irregular Force was tasked to conduct watch and ward missions with the assistance of quick reaction forces to chase Pashtuns in border areas. According to Moreman, British formed cavalry regiments, infantry detachments, dispersed mud forts, ravines, outposts blocking valleys and different lines of approaches which restricted the assaults and raids of Pashtun gangs. Intercepting parties, intelligence gathering and surveillance units patrolled across the ground to intercept raiders and locals who created trouble (Moreman, 2008). Pashtuns continued their infiltration into Punjab as it was impossible for British to block 700-mile boundary with the scarcity of men and material resource; whereas, the mountaineers were capable to make extraordinary marches on animals and feet while crossing narrow passes, glens, rocks, ridges and hillocks (Punjab

Administration Report, 1849-52). British mainly relied on their political officers for the maintenance of amity with tribes and only retaliated to the Pashtun raids. Although the British constructed multiple forts and outposts manned with regular and irregular soldiers which posed little resistance to tribesmen. British applied corrective measures and imposed punitive expeditions to neutralize the Pashtun threat. British mostly triggered a punitive expedition to errant a tribe or capture the wanted criminals which Pashtun refused to hand over to the British because of their Pashtunwali code (Moreman, 2006). British expeditions against Mehsud and Afridi along with other tribes were other than regular warfare which were against the trouble-makers but not the countrymen. The warfare was not civilized as the enemy was not in the possession of trained military troops and contemporary warfare firearms and tactics. Temple always considered Pashtuns as combatants and he considered sparing the Pashtuns as sparing the hostile arsenals. Expeditions and operation in Waziristan were never easy for the British as it requires long logistic column in the challenging terrain, narrow passes of valleys and rivers beds. British conducted fifteen major "Butcher and Bolt" expeditions from 1849 to 1857 (Barthorp, 1982). According to Moreman, Punjab Irregular Force (PIF) learned special principles and tactics to deal with Pashtun Lashkars by trial and error through multiple encounters with Pashtun fighters. Infantry learned skirmishing skills, light infantry skills, marksmanship skills, fieldcraft, self-resilience and arms skills to equal tribesmen. British also trained mountain batteries to small arms easy to dismantle, transportable on mules and assemble at forwarding posts. British and Indian soldiers always targeted a large number of causalities to bring tribesmen to terms. The British army also disheartened these tribesmen by destroying their crops and burning their villages. British troops always safeguarded themselves by maintaining high grounds while conducting such punitive expeditions. In 1850, an operation gives us an insight into the actions as Afridi tribe received an annual subsidy for the maintenance of peace while their tribesmen attacked British engineers who were constructing a road. These tribesmen wounded and killed many workers on the site. It resulted in another expedition by the British which marched towards Kohat Pass, surrounded the peaks and assaulted Afridis in the village of Akhor. Maliks came into action to make negotiations but the tribesmen did not agree to the British terms. British partly destroyed the village, captured many and burnt the houses (Swinson, 1912). British manned the heights in the night but in the morning as they left their posts and tribesmen found a chance to react, they struck, wounded many and forced British troops to their artilleries. With every new expedition and expedition after expedition the tribesmen also read the operating procedure of British troops, tribesmen read the movement of British troops, their tactics, positions, pickets and guards and responded according – responded well. These expeditions and response of tribesmen seemed like a battle drill. Pashtuns kept on generating unrest for the British. In 1897, tribesmen murdered a British Political Officer who was in the tribal area to attend a local council (Jirga). British made swift advances to Waziristan to assassinate the culprit. The wayward tribesmen were punished and rebellion was quelled by Tochi Field Force well versed in conducting frontier warfare.

With increasing ties with tribesmen, British replaced Nawab of *Tank* with Major Charles Macaulay (1871-1882). Azem Khan Kundi and Niabi Khan Shingi were new intermediaries for Macauley who replaced Nawab of Tank. Associates of Nawab of Tank started a series of kidnaps, murders and raids to discredit the political status of new British intermediaries. These raids and attacks also demonstrated the factional alliance of Mehsud tribes. Mehsud raids in British territories reduced to almost zero because of British enacted Frontier Crimes Regulations (1872) and Macauley's adjustment with Bhittani tribe while securing Dera Ismail Khan side (Ibid, 218). The effort of the settlement of Mehsud families in British controlled territories also went futile because it set the base for settlement between Afghan Amir Sher Ali Khan and Nawab of Tank to counter British invasion in Afghanistan. Mehsud remained unsettled due to political unrest and manoeuvres. British authority badly collapsed due to an attack on Tank Bazaar (1879) led by Mehsud's, Umar Khan and Amir Sher Ali Khan in the backdrop of Second Anglo-Afghan War (1878-1880) (Hugh, 2002). British managed to restore their writ but they were not able to mount an immediate punitive expedition. Initially, the British enacted reverse blockade while Macaulay responded in 1881 by mounting the punitive expedition. British destroyed the substantial property of tribes but did not manage to achieve desired outcomes. The reverse blockade caused tribes to comply with British demands while submitting to British rule. The overall situation of Waziristan remained quite in the latter part of the 1880s and early 1890s following the end of Second Anglo-Afghan War and treaty between Afghan Amir Abdul-Rehman and British. British controlled the foreign policy of Afghanistan while exercising control over major passes which restrained foreign aggressors like Russia. The Russian advancement towards British garrison at Pandieh (Afghanistan) led to a near miss of armed conflict due to successful diplomacy which led to the demarcation of Russian / Afghanistan border in 1887. Amir Rehman also incited tribes against the British rule while British were improving lines of communication between Afghanistan and India in the crisis of 1885 in the British controlled territory of Kurram and Khyber valleys (Michael, 1982). In November 1894, Tribes also raided Durand Commission which was tasked for delimitation causing damage to *Mehsud* tribe's sovereignty. British launched three-column punitive expeditions against Mehsud tribe while destroying their fortifications and villages. The punitive expedition was renewed in January 1895 causing further destruction to Mehsud tribe. British also started a direct liaison with the tribes through their political agents. British also showed their permanent presence in Kurram and Tochi by establishing permanent military installations. The British punitive expedition against Wazir tribe fired a huge Pashtun revolt against the British which included Afridi, Orakzai, Mohmand, Mamund, Uthman Khel, Swati and Bunerwal tribes. Local religious scholars fueled the fighting spirit of Jihad among the fighters of these tribes. It was surprising that the Mehsud tribe did not become a part of this revolt even being most cooperative with the British (Barth, 1965). Mehsud's did not join the Pashtun revolt but they resumed their raids against the British in the leadership of Mullah Powindah – a religious firebird. British kept on changing their policy concerning Waziristan and the tradition of launching a punitive expedition against the Pashtuns

also continued with a mixed approach of engaging tribes with political agents, imposing reverse blockades and levying huge fines. British used both positive and negative incentives to handle tribesmen but the punitive expeditions brought mixed outcomes with huge men and material losses. British limited the "Butcher and Bolt" punitive expeditions due to lack of manpower, the fierceness of tribesmen, forbidden terrain and fear of heavy causalities. British always tried to limit their vulnerability through brief and destructive excursions till the mid of 19th century. Tribesmen faced serious repercussions of being taken as hostages and reverse blockades. British described tribesmen as the finest fighters because of their exceptional fighting skills as they never left any tactical mistake unpunished (Government Central Press Delhi, 1923). The martial ethos of the tribes always failed the British to achieve their desired goals in Waziristan. British always praised the warning and surveillance system of tribesmen. The heavy air and artillery support along with the long-term presence of British forces failed to permanently subdue tribesmen in Waziristan. Faqir of Ipi and Mullah Powindah eluded the British pursuits for decades without being captures of killed through complex terrain, Melmastia and religious doctrines.

BRITISH IMPOSED MALIK SYSTEM IN TRIBAL AREAS

Different tribes constitute Pashtun society in the leadership of respective leaders for their vested interests. Malik is a term used for these tribal leaders. Robert Bruce – a British Officer started the Maliki system in tribal areas in 1890. British idealized controlling tribesmen through their leadership. Maliks were assigned the duty of identifying disturbing factors in return of monetary benefits given to them called Lungi. Common people also received stipend - Moajab. Maliki features a hereditary system which did not produce true and genuine leadership. Maliks were of both types recognized and not recognized by the political agents distinguished based on receipt of *lungi*. Maliks were legal representatives of the British government who were authorized to attest documents and delegate bail orders as political representatives. These were only Maliks who only received the development schemes of the government. Leadership concept prevails throughout the world in all communities as they quide and represent their communities. Tribes are distributed in small pockets of communities which were led by their respective leaders. According to Ahmed (1980), all those elders who were loyal to British authorities were given the title of Malik to exercise different favours extended by the government to perform certain duties while ensuring law and order in the tribal areas favouring the British. Areas where the British exercised little or no strategic influence were not given any Malik. Malik help in collecting revenue in settled areas where their services are no more requires as it is important in non-settled areas. The prevalence of Malik system in tribal areas is still relevant. Pashtun solidarity heavily relies on Pashtunwali (collective consciousness) – a code of conduct. Pashtun integration also relies on factors like authority and power. Malik is a person of higher hierarchy in Pashtun society who mediates between the government and locals. The economic position of British representatives was also stable as they presented a higher hierarchy of society. A Malik is entitled through the delegated powers of government to distribute *Moajab* among tribal people, collection of fines, attestation of documents, the arrangement of Lakhkar (groups of fighters), execution of development projects, Lokhay (making foreigners a member of the tribal community), the formation of Jirga, recruitment of *Khassadar*, delegating bail, settlement of murder disputes, settlement of kidnapping cases, the witness of land sale / purchase, demolishing of poppy cultivation and appointing religious cleric (Maulvi Sahib). Maliks were government agents who performed their responsibilities in tribes and helped the government in the implementation of their writ. Maliks ensured the implementation of punishments awarded by the government officials along with the collection of fines. Most respected Maliks were approached by the political agents to influence people about matters regarding the practice of government authority. Maliks enjoyed fewer powers in Mehsud tribe than of Afridi tribe as Mehsud tribe considered every member of the tribe equal Mehsud. Common people used Maliks as a source to communicate with government authorities.

CONCLUSION

The desolate location, martial ethos, tribal fierceness, broken terrain and related inherent features make Waziristan one of the most enigmatic global areas. British colonial experience will always be a lighthouse for those who plan a strategy to subdue these tribes as British has remained extensively engaged with tribes dwelling in Waziristan from 1849 till the partition of 1947. Even after decades the relevance of military, political, ethnographical and geographical factors has not significantly shifted in Waziristan. British played with the tribal attitude by using both negative and positive incentives which include punitive expeditions, shifting tribal policies, seizure of property, reverse blockades, levied fines, removal of trade barriers, inducting tribesmen in paid militia and settlement of tribesmen in British-controlled territories. Pashtun population dwelling in tribal settlements always posed a danger to outsiders invading tribal areas (Gale & Polden, 1938). The nature of *Mahsud* was highly independent which never allowed them to trade for their independence. They always resisted British moves against them such as the building of cantonments on encroached areas of *Mehsud* tribe. Although, British managed to transgress in their areas but did not succeed in subduing *Mehsud* tribesmen. Whereas, Afridi's major concern was their economic state which heavily relied on their trade with Afghanistan and Peshawar through Khyber Pass. Afridis remained calm till the time they were restricted to operate through Khyber Pass but the hindrance posed by the British troops always incited them to revolt and respond. Religious leadership influenced the *Mehsuds* in the time of crisis but their major concerns were perseverance of their culture and independence. On the contrary, Afridis remained under the influence of religious figures such as Syed Akbar Shah. For instance, the best example of religious will is well displayed in 1897 uprising. Although other factors like trade undermining and salt tax also instigated the Afridi tribesmen against the British the religious fervour led the cause.

Maliks never gained control and popularity among Mehsuds due to their democratic doctrines as every Mehsud was considered equal Mehsud; whereas, Maliks were influential against Afridi tribe ensuring British writ over them. British never gained access and control over *Mehsuds* through scouts and tribal levies – resistance always kept on increasing. British relatively managed to exercise their control over Afridis through Maliki system, the sanction of allowances and inclusion of tribesmen in Khyber Rifles. Blockades and expeditions were not always fruitful against the Mehsud tribe but it managed to secure an unwilling surrender of Afridi tribe. The mixed strategies have accomplished mixed outcomes for British authorities. Although, with the demarcation of the border as Durand Line British implemented forward policy in Waziristan but on the whole, they failed to completely subdue the free will of these tribesmen. British resorted to punitive expeditions because of non-compliance of positive incentives by destroying tribal villages and killing the tribesmen. British kept on launching punitive expeditions against *Mehsud*, Afridi and other coalition tribes in different times of 1852, 1860, 1881, 1895 and onwards. British also failed to subjugate the Pashtun revolt led by religious firebirds. British best managed the tribes through continuous negotiations and political engagement. No single course of action either punitive expeditions or political engagement proved successful but a mixed approach of positive and negative incentives. It is difficult to defeat the tribesmen in their territory because of their martial ethos and complex terrain. Tribal fighters ambushed British convoys, fought in lost or isolated columns and during the night. The religious fervour, cultural ties and *Pashtunwali* mostly influenced the tribesmen. The Pashtun opposition to British rule was more political than religious which was not supported by Mehsuds even being the most troublesome frontier tribe. Male members of the tribes always considered British presence in their territory as a challenge to their autonomy. British always shifted to the application of draconian violence to level tribal resistance by employing different strategies. Tribal broken terrain and dispersed population mitigated the technological and firepower of British. The ambiguous authority of Maliks and Chiefs did not secure any sustainable agreement with tribes. British introduced the Maliki system to control the local population of Waziristan by maintaining law and order while highlighting the troublesome agents. British used Maliki system reward tribal leaders which proved a success story for British authorities. Maliki system institutionalized Jirga which used for the settlement of disputes by the trusted people of society in local areas. Maliki system lacked communication between the locals and political administration. Maliki system failed to produce genuine leadership due to hereditary structuring. British did not achieve much from their punitive expeditions and political settlements in Waziristan and left tribal belt in 1947 as they were in the 1840s.

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